CASTING POST-SOCIALIST MEMORY
Monuments and Memorials as Instruments of Identity Politics in the Ukraine

Viktoriya Hryaban

New discourses of national identity in the successor states of the Soviet Union often seem fragmentary, conducted in an irregular, even contradictory fashion. Although they aspire to achieve coherent identities built on solid historical foundations, such discourses are doomed to failure when they meet reality in the form of political decisions, patriotic events and nationalist art. Their clear aims become clouded, and their target groups are often left perplexed in a public sphere characterised by traces of this search for identity.

An inventory of the present state of affairs in the Ukraine as regards these discourses reveals that, twelve years after the declaration of independence in 1991, the urban habitat in particular offers a promising field for investigation. The continual development and restructuring of cities make them especially suited to rendering past and present transformations visible, as they are on the one hand a privileged site of such changes, and on the other, represent them in their entirety. Among the numerous media which transmit history and identity, monuments and memorials mark central places in our cities and landscapes with their messages. Devoid of the functional value of monumental buildings, they unfold their power by their centripetal influence on the space which surrounds them and the metaphorical power of their ‘material political symbolism’ (Mittig 1993: 26). Observers of classic Soviet or Ukrainian statues can see the former as an unfolding of the past in a present space. Larger-than-life statues showing the human body in exaggeratedly melodramatic poses, often gesturing with raised arms, dominate the surrounding area with their representation of history and arouse in the observer a sense of the responsibility which they owe...
to this historical perspective. Material symbolism intensifies this effect by generalising it and making it a matter of collective responsibility. Monuments of marble, steel and bronze lay claim to consistency and collectivity, as the attributes of their materials seem to address their message not just to all contemporary observers, but also to generations to come. This is a game in which the figures on the board often fall out of favour and disappear from the public sphere as unworthy of a monument before they can really take hold of the collective memory (see Menkovic 1996). Nevertheless, each new statue of bronze, each new monument in marble is erected to last centuries. It is not surprising that the loudest calls for the use of these principles are to be found in the totalitarian systems of the early twentieth century.

In the context of National Socialist art theory, Friedrich Tamms describes the programmatic aims distilled for Nazi Germany in the 1940s in the ‘law of the monumental’ (‘Gesetz des Monumentalen’). According to this, the monumental has to be ‘useless in a practical sense, but the carrier of an idea. It has to carry something inaccessible in itself, which fills people with admiration but also with awe. It must be impersonal, because it is not the work of an individual, but the symbol of a community bound together by a common ideal’ (Tamms 1944: 60). Neither the embellishment of cities nor supporting art nor honouring esteemed personages and events is central here. Instead, the monumental is driven by the active configuration of national identity and belief in the truth value of a particular history – of a national destiny.

This illustration has been omitted for copyright reasons.

Ill. 1: Demolition of Lenin’s monument in Chernivcy, Ukraine, in 1991. (Photo by Olexander Masan.)
The Legitimisation of National Identity – History and Memory

In contrast to the established democracies of Western Europe, the question of how to deal with one’s own identity crops up in almost all areas of public and private life for a young state like the Ukraine. The Declaration of Independence on 24 August 1991 drew a definitive demarcation line between ‘self’ and ‘other’ and also established clear identities and affiliations in international law. At the same time however, in other arenas, in cities, villages and communities, debates on origins, identity and their representation had only just begun. Monuments and memorials were and are a privileged form of the material representation of identity in the successor states to the Soviet Union. The dismantling and destruction of Soviet monuments in the early 1990s was primarily a matter of limiting the references to the Soviet Union which were still too omnipresent in social and political structures. The emblems and figures in stone and metal erected to replace Marx and Lenin were then used to legitimise the Ukraine as a state in the eyes of its inhabitants. Due to the Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Soviet past of the areas which make up the Ukraine today, not to mention the Stalinist policy of enforced resettlement of whole tribes and races, the new political elite in the Ukraine saw themselves confronted with a heterogeneous population whose commitments to various ethnic, religious and linguistic groups were often contradictory.

The aim of unification under the Ukrainian trident on its yellow-blue background could therefore only be achieved by reconfiguring the symbols of identity and affiliation in all spheres of life. As Pierre Bourdieu emphasises, transformations of these symbols show the struggles between political elites over whose prerogative it is to intervene and determine or change these lieux de mémoire, loaded as they are with historical and personal values (Bourdieu 1977, ...
In an attempt to preserve and extend their legitimacy and power, the political elite entered into a symbolic dialogue with their own past and with society. Above all, the erection and design of public statues and monuments represents the whole discussion process which surrounds a state’s representative orientation. Groups which possess political and economic power try to prove that those persons and events which correspond to their ideas of identity and history are worthy of monuments, and to make sure that their symbols are widely disseminated. Public debate around these topoi is mostly about the past, or to be more precise, about history and the necessity of rediscovering the truth, which in this case meant eliminating Soviet propaganda and making the traces of the suppressed historiography of an independent Ukrainian nation visible once more.

In this respect, the monuments and memorials erected after 1991 are ‘witnesses to a doubly historical time’ (Reichel 1995: 49), as they do not only represent a particular perspective on history but also make visible the agents of this selection in the present, who through the representation of the past are trying to legitimise present and future measures. Many and disparate are the groups who engage in such practices, from politicians to societies for national heritage to the diaspora. Nevertheless, their debates on the correct way of representing Ukrainian identity share an emphasis on the history of the nation’s development. However, Pierre Nora’s distinction between memory and history shows that history is only ostensibly in the foreground of these debates. An understanding of history as a reconstructed representation of the past, as distinct from memory as an ‘ever present phenomenon, a tie which is experienced in an eternal present’ emphasises that the ‘strongest of our collective traditions’ (Nora 1990: 13), the configuration of our past as a collective, has less to do with honouring and handing down the past than with shaping the present and the future.

Socialist Realism and the ‘Monumental Propaganda’ Plan
Although formal knowledge of these functions and effects was an achievement of the late twentieth-century cultural studies movement, their strategic use to construct a collective identity had already been implemented on a grand scale in Ukrainian history at the beginning of the century by Bolshevism. The ‘Monumental Propaganda’ decree, signed by Lenin and published in Pravda on 14 April 1918 (Bowlt 1978: 185), shows how manipulation in public spaces with the help of art and architecture is aimed at forming a new identity, a new consciousness. The purpose of this decree, alongside the renaming of cities and streets, was in particular the which were to express the ‘ideals and feelings of the workers of revolutionary Russia’ (Izvestija 1918). On 30 July in the same year, Radnarkom (Highest Committee of the People’s Commissioners) confirmed a list of 66 people, artists as well as revolutionaries, whose work was considered especially progressive and who were therefore judged to be worthy of monuments. However, to Lenin’s disappointment, the removal of the ‘repulsive idols, erected to the honour of the czar and his servants’ did not call forth the euphoria he had hoped for. The artists commissioned expressed moderate enthusiasm. Only after several invitations had been issued were 30 provisional monuments of plaster, cement and wood erected to mark the first anniversary of the revolution in Moscow. After a ‘people’s debate’, 17 of them were to be conferred the honour of lasting preservation in bronze and stone. This plan was never carried out in full, as both the political leaders and the people were dissatisfied with the results. The art historian N. Radlow attributed the failure of this monumental plan, not to the sculptors’ lack of ability, but to the ‘conditions of the time: life was lived by the day and did not encourage in any way the execution of monumental tasks, which require calm synthesis’ (Radlow 1923: 35). This assessment by a contemporary figure illustrates clearly what seems to be a prerequisite for developing the power of monuments as the projection surface of a future which has been ennobled by monumental promises.
In Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, the realisation of this plan began on 7 May 1919. One of the first monuments to be removed in 1917 was the statue of P. Stolpyn, chairman of the council of ministers under Nicolai II. By 1923, 8 further monuments had been dismantled, including statues of Czars Nicolai I and Alexander III. Amongst the monuments that had been newly erected, there was a statue of the Ukrainian poet Taras Schewtschenko (1814–1861), to whose functional value as a symbol and figure-head for both the Soviet Union and the Ukraine will be discussed later in this article.

The ‘Monumental Propaganda’ plan clearly shows how in Leninist theory the artist as political agitator was rework his material, to shape the urban environment according to socialist ideals. However, although its function and content were predeter-

This illustration has been omitted for copyright reasons.

mined, no-one could agree on how this art should look. The debates on stylistic alignment took place at the beginning of the 1920s in a climate of increasing politicisation of art and representation, as they were incorporated more and more in the regime’s apparatus. As part of this process, art was given the didactic task of translating the politics and ideology of communism in a language which everyone could understand. At the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s, the production of art, in large quantities and organised in production centres, was already an established part of the state information machine. The main ‘buyer’, if not the only one, was the state. Soon the range of memorials was extended to include all the shining lights of the communist view of history. Busts and monuments of philosophers, writers, artists and academics, typically, realistically and geo-

Ill. 3: Lenin monuments erected in the Soviet Union. (Above from the left: Chernivtsy, Kiev (UA), Ulan Ude (RU), down from the left: Pryluky (UA), Grutas (LT), Sankt-Petersburg (RU), Kiev (UA).
metrically correct, found their way into the smallest and most remote communities. After 1932, artistic production finally fixed on the term ‘Socialist Realism’. At this time, the whole country was already flooded with strictly uniform statues and monuments, from the large, sometimes huge images of Marx and Lenin in cities, flanked by the ‘big buildings of communism’ right down to more modest depictions of workers and sportsmen and women in public parks.

It would be wrong to conclude however that this uniform aesthetic, always produced in the same combinations as if on a conveyor belt, was ideologically driven mimesis. Boris Groys describes the mimetic character of Socialist Realist painting as ‘just an illusion (…) just one of very many ideologically motivated messages’ (Groys 1996: 63). Instead, Socialist Realism defined itself through its methods. Firstly, the artist had to choose the right contents and symbols to represent and order the ideals of real socialism, and secondly, these ideals had to be transmitted in a form which would be comprehensible to the working population. The term ‘realism’ can quickly become misleading here, as it conceals the fact that it was not a matter of mimetically portraying reality, but projecting the blessing of a communist future, making it visible (Groys 1996: 142).

In this way, works of art such as monuments were meant to symbolise the collective and individual dream of a new world and a new identity. The task of Socialist Realism lay in showing life in its revolutionary development: national in its form and socialist in its content (Groys 1994: 16).

These two worlds were already difficult enough to get to harmonise with each other, but it seemed practically impossible for the artists executing the monuments to remain faithful to the contradictory directives of the party leadership. When analysing Socialist Realism, it is therefore also important to consider the working conditions under which it was produced. The atmosphere of the time is shown clearly in an article by the architect Karo Alabjan published in 1936, ‘Against Formalism, Schematicism and Eclecticism’ (Alabjan 1936). No art history background is needed here to see that very little space was left for professions of expressive freedom. In accordance with Stalin, Alabjan formulated the paradoxical rule which decreed that every single form of architecture and art was to be subjected to merciless criticism. Both clear and simple forms as well as contradictory and experimental designs were considered treacherous. The prevailing suspicion, one which proved fatal for some artists, was that stylistic purity and adherence to principles of form were only possible for a bourgeois consciousness. Communist artists were confronted with the demand to unify contradictory elements. The ‘superhuman monumental’ had simultaneously to create an ‘intimate, human and cosy’ effect (Groys 1994: 17).

The people’s greatness had to be emphasised as much as the life of the individual worker. The theory behind this is taken from the dialectics of historical materialism, according to which only the sum of the contradictions and paradoxes of all the individual art works together can establish their inner similarities and therefore the idea of Soviet society. However, in the final instance, Alabjan’s article does not contain a concrete answer to the question which remains the main issue to this day: how a statue should look, how and where it should be erected, and how it should embody its target ideals.

N. A. Bulganin and L. Kaganovitsch, both Stalinist spokesmen, specified a possible answer to this question at the congress of Soviet architects in 1937 with a call for ‘highly qualified creation’ (Bulganin 1937: 18). High quality production was to ensure that the absolute was represented in all individual work in an ideal form. The charisma of several individual works was to provide an ensemble which in turn would represent a city, a country and eventually, the nation. A hint as to what was to be depicted in such a ‘highly qualified’ way can be found in the writings of G. M. Malenkov, member of the Politbureau and Stalin’s private secretary. Art and architecture should represent ‘the typical’. According to Malenkov, ‘Our artists, writers and performers must always show awareness in their work that the typical is not that which is most common, but that which expresses the essence of a particular social force with the greatest persuasive power’ (Report from the 19th Party Con-
ference. Quoted by Groys 1996: 58). When we look at the aesthetics of Soviet monuments, it becomes clear that this 'essence' was thought to be in the expressive power of lofty gestures and larger-than-life statues and tableaux.

Transformations of Memory in Today's Ukraine

When we compare this Soviet symbolic ideal with the aesthetics of the anthropocentric statues and monuments which have been erected in the Ukraine since 1991, it becomes clear that the planning of memorials and cities with protagonists of a collective Ukrainian identity follows an almost identical pathos of immediacy and candour. The obvious conclusion would seem to be that typically Ukrainian content is being propagated using the patterns of the discarded Soviet tradition. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union the new (old) Ukrainian elites began to spread propaganda for the idea of a new Ukrainian identity through statues and monuments, using the symbolism of Socialist Realism that had been established for decades. Like chess pieces on a board which is centuries old, figures were changed on the pedestals where previously czarist and Soviet representatives had embodied the unity and absolutism of their respective systems.

The monuments to B. Chmelnyzky, a Ukrainian Hetman (Cossak ruler), and M. Zanjkowezka, a Ukrainian actress, were presented to the public in 1993 on the 1000th anniversary of the foundation of the city of Nizyn in the Tschernihiv region. In Dnepropetrowsk, a memorial was erected to D. Javornyzky, a member of the Academy of Sciences. Statues followed of Kiril and Mephodij, the inventors of the Cyrillic alphabet, also of Princess Olga, unveiled 1996 in Kiev, of J. Fedkowitsch in 1995 in Chernivci, and of K. Haiskoij, builder of a steel works in Luchansk, in 1996. After the unveiling of a monuments to the arts patron J. Charitonenko in Sumny 1996, memorials to Prince Jaroslav Mudryj were unveiled in Kiev 1997 and in Charkiv in 1999, to Prince Roman Mstyslavitsch in Kolky in 1997, to the academic, folklorist and teacher O. Duchnovitsch in Uzgorod in 1997, in Kiev to the first president of the Ukraine Hruschewsky, in 1998 and in Chernivci to the singer Nazar Jaremtschuk in December 1998 (Lytvyn 2000: 153ff).

This list could be continued ad infinitum. The common denominator shared by all these erections and inaugurations is the absolute commitment to an archaeology of the Ukraine's own identity in the places where history had been staged by the 'other' before 1991. This process of course demands a dynamic of distancing or disassociation from the Soviet past, however when looked at closer, this dynamic is counteracted by the use of aesthetic means which are taken from this very same tradition.

Lenin's successor on the main squares of the bigger cities and on the walls of public spaces was the 'Father of the Ukrainian Nation', Taras Schewtschenko. Readings and ceremonies in Schewtschenko's honour have been held since the declaration of independence in all Ukrainian towns and villages. Innumerable statues have been dedicated to him, to name just a selected few: in 1992 in Chernihiv, 1995 in Luzk, 1998 in Luchans and in 1999 in Uzgorod and Chernivci. In 1994, the 180th anniversary of Schewtschenko's birthday, ceremonial inspections of the monuments dedicated to him were carried out in Charkiv, Tscherkasy and Lviv (Lytvyn 2000: 65ff; Zberezhemo... 2003: 2).

Post-1991 Ukraine was not the first to recognise Schewtschenko's suitability as a marker of the transition from a history determined by others to self-determined history. His biography had already been redefined as that of a revolutionary hero under the Soviets. For the Bolshevists, Schewtschenko was a prime example of imperial oppression by the czarist regime. The monument 'Kobsar' to the former serf and poet was erected in Kiev in 1918, and was supposed to show the Ukrainians the difference between czarist oppression and the Soviets' tolerance of national distinctions (Wanner 1998: 177). Whilst Schewtschenko was never at the top of the Soviet hierarchy and therefore never to be found on main squares in cities, he has now been given the leading role as far as the staging of Ukrainian tradition and history are concerned. The repression of the Russian monarchy is no longer considered to have
been directed at the protester and revolutionary who demanded social equality, but at the nationalist Ukrainian democrat and artist. Schewtschenko has proved himself to be a national figure of identification, a carefully chosen middle way in contrast to the radical nationalists and former fighters for the Ukrainian cause such as Stepan Bandera (Head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). These contradictory uses of a historical figure show very clearly how the meaning and function of a sign can be transformed according to its location within a network of contextual reference.

The concerted iconoclasm which had to precede these changes was not however equally successful throughout the country. Along the historic borders from before 1944, an East–West divide has also become clear in monument politics. Whilst Lenin can still be seen in more than one Eastern city, larger-than-life and pointing to the Soviet legacy with his lifted arm, the Lenin statue on the main square of Lviv, the cultural centre of the West Ukraine, was destroyed with a crane as early as 1990 by an enthusiastic, cheering crowd. A hole was left which slowly filled with water, and a fountain recalled the mighty fallen until a statue of Schewtschenko was erected shortly after as a replacement. In Kiev the Lenin statue on the former Square of the October Revolution was daubed in August 1991 with swastikas and the words ‘Satan’ and ‘Fuck’. The original plan was to demolish the statue by explosion, but as it had been erected over a metro station, this idea was discarded, and it was then dismantled piece by piece. Today this place is overloaded with advertisements for foreign banks, computer firms and soft drinks manufacturers. Lenin, the icon of Socialism, has been replaced by new signs of capitalist hegemony in the service of stimulating consumerism. It seems easier to dispose of and forget representations of Soviet ideology in this way than by using the protagonists of a Ukrainian identity (Wanner 1998: 183–185).

The question of how to treat the monuments of obsolete empires and systems remains controversial today, as does that of the necessity and justification for new statues. Contemporary Ukraine has developed varying strategies for dealing with these legacies, ranging from demands for the removal of all representations which do not fit in the framework of nationalist Ukrainian identity concepts, to the practice of leaving the old symbols in their place as relics which have been devalued by the progress of history. In Charkiv, in the Eastern Ukraine, the latter strategy was chosen, and the bulky, 20 meters high Lenin statue erected in 1963 was left on the Square of Independence, the second largest square in the world after Tiananmen Square. It is no surprise that this square then became a favourite location for protests and opposition marches.

Conflicts between two different concepts of collective remembrance also arose during the planning and erection of a Schewtschenko memorial in Luchansk. As early as 1992, the city council decided to place a Schewtschenko statue on the city’s main square. However, it was unable to provide the funds for such an expensive project. Eventually, at the instigation of the organisation ‘Supporters of Schewtschenko’ founded in 1995, a world-wide fund-raising drive began. The sculptor Ivan Chumak emerged victorious from a competition also held in 1995 with the plan for a 5½ meters high bronze statue of Schewtschenko with a granite pedestal. The funding available within the Ukraine, 30,000 hrivna from the city council, 10,000 hrivna from the government and 20,000 hrivna from private sponsors, was nowhere near enough to finance the project. Only after an appeal had been launched to the Ukrainian diaspora, above all in Canada and the USA, was it possible to begin building with a further $50,000 of donations. It then transpired that the site originally intended was not viable for geological reasons, and so it was decided that the monument be erected in the place which until then had been named for the fallen of the Second World War and dedicated to their memory. Fierce protests against the name change and the erection of the new statue broke out amongst veterans’ associations, supported by left-wing political factions. Appeals from the ‘Supporters of Schewtschenko’ to President Kutschma and threats from the war veterans were the despair of the newly elected mayor Jevremov, who was caught between the two fronts. The struggle between these two cults of
the dead finally concluded, to the veterans’ satisfaction, with the erection of an additional memorial in honour of the fallen of the Second World War, and, to the satisfaction of the supporters of the Ukrainian nationalist cause, with the erection of the Schewtschenko monument without its granite pedestal in the place it was originally planned for. This shows what an important role the commemoration of the dead of the Second World War still plays in society today as far as the identity formation of survivors is concerned. It also shows how easy it is for this to collide with other forms of remembrance.

**Institutionalised Forms of Representation**

Victory over National Socialism and Fascism was one of the formative experiences of the former Soviet Union. It marked a turning point in the history of the USSR, a shift in international geo-politics which in turn caused fundamental changes in the situation within the Soviet Union. Memorials grew in size and pathos; Western fear of the Soviet Union’s military might was stylised and the heroism of its population was immortalised throughout the land in enormous complexes and monuments. Whilst in the big cities whole landscapes were created anew for this purpose, people limited themselves to the erection of less expensive symbols in smaller towns. Although these representations exploited the violent death of millions to legitimise the actions of former and present rulers and to make ‘the private character of mourning a matter of national concern’ (Menkovic 1996) in the former Soviet Union, these monuments have survived the transition to Ukrainian independence astonishingly well.

The most impressive reminder of this tradition is the ‘Batkivshchina’ in Kiev, which dominates the cityscape with its surrounding set of reliefs, statues, tanks, aeroplanes and anti-aircraft guns from the Second World War. Today this place is used by the population above all for recreation, as a destination for excursions and a popular place for representative photographs after ceremonies, birthdays and weddings. In smaller towns, this commemorative practice is recalled by monuments to the first soldiers to liberate the place, tanks on pedestals which were the first to break through enemy lines, a gravestone with the names of the dead or a red star. Even after Ukrainian independence, representations of collective experiences of suffering and catastrophe are a privileged theme for monumental representations in the public sphere. The forms of representation of Ukrainian identity and history chosen by decision-makers in these cases can help us trace development of visual interventions in urban space with reference to what being Ukrainian is supposed to mean.

A classic monument to the victims of the Second World War was completed in Kovel, in the Wolyn region, in 1996. In Wolyn itself, a memorial was erected in 1995 to the Ukrainian soldiers who fell in Afghanistan, and in Chernivci for the soldiers of Kuryn in the Bukowina. Further monuments were unveiled in Poltawa in 1999 to the fallen Ukrainian Cossaks, in Rubiznyj and in Chernivci in 1999 for the soldiers who died in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. In Ivano-Frankivsk the bell tower was publicly dedicated to the memory of the victims of Bolshevik terror in 1998. Not just war and terror are to be remembered: a monument put up in Chernivci in 2002 commemorates the helpers who died as a result of the reactor accident in Chernobyl (Lytvyn 2000: 286ff; Zberezhemo… 2003: 3).

The structures of standardised representative ideals to be seen in these monuments are nothing new when considered against a background of traditional Soviet town planning. Memorials and monuments have been given an important and clearly regulated place in the configuration of urban space, according to their subject matter and how they present it. In analogy to the hierarchies of the Soviet Union, the politics of representation and the construction of a Ukrainian identity through monuments also have a clearly defined structure. This legacy applies to a wide range of monuments, from the replacement of Lenin by Schewtschenko, to the adoption of the memorials to the many wars, right up to the artists and writers. The statues of Schiller and Goethe from the early 20th century were replaced by Marx and Robespierre, and today have been replaced yet again by statues of the Ukrainian poet Lesja Ukrainka and the Ukrainian philosopher Ivan Franko. There are
however also considerable differences between the Soviet Union and today’s Ukraine, not least of which is the discrepancy in the means at their disposal. More important still are the different purposes of their respective identity politics. Soviet intervention aimed to embody the idea of a nation ‘outside the limits of history’, the supposed conclusion of socio-political evolution in an eschatological final stage of scientific socialism, whereas the Ukraine is endeavouring to create a fully valid democratic state modelled on Western European lines.

The representative forms of the new Ukrainian statues conform in almost every case to the Socialist Realist models from the time of Stalin. In opposition to Kant’s definition of art as ‘disinterested pleasure’, the politics of landscaping still follow the Leninist idea of using the suggestive and regulating power of art in the public sphere to construct and consolidate a sphere of self-identity.

Even if these new monuments harmonise with the existing urban panorama, this cannot conceal the fact that they are ultimately the means for partitioning, domesticating and marking cities as sites of ideological struggle. The power of images and embodiments represents the symbolic instance of law and demands loyalty from those who behold them. Through their strategic position in big squares, their functions change quicker than their planners would like. Rituals such as mass demonstrations and protests do not care about the aims of those who erected the monuments, but use the power of these lieux de mémoire for their own purposes.

The changes which take place are generally quickly integrated into people’s daily lives. In the first days...
and weeks, monuments are enthusiastically received or rejected, soon however they become barely noticeable. Robert Musil’s dictum that ‘there is nothing in the world as invisible as a monument’ (Musil 1936: 87), opens up a further debate as to whether contemporary aesthetics, not to mention the representative forms of monuments and memorials per se, can still function as a modern way of remembering at all.

Nonetheless, the cases described above depict the transition in the politics of memory from the Russian monarchy to the Soviet Union and on to the successor ‘New Independent States’, and open up possibilities for observing the shifting configurations of hierarchies, classifications and categories. The specific visibility of these processes in the Ukraine are therefore not only markers of current changes in the representation of national identity, but can also be used to uncover the underlying vocabulary of symbolic deformation, change and replacement which are at work whenever and wherever monuments are erected.

Notes
1 Part of the armed Ukrainian Resistance.
2 To be found in Rubiznyj in the classic representative form of a tank in attack mode on a pedestal.

References


Iswestija 1918. 14 April. Moscow.

Viktoriya Hryaban, PhD, finished her research in Bukowina for the project “Center/Periphery in the Rule and Culture of the Habsburg Monarchy 1867–1918” at the Vienna University in January 2006. She is currently working with a project on the Europeanization in the Ukraine.

Notes
1 Part of the armed Ukrainian Resistance.
2 To be found in Rubiznyj in the classic representative form of a tank in attack mode on a pedestal.

References


Iswestija 1918. 14 April. Moscow.

Viktoriya Hryaban, PhD, finished her research in Bukowina for the project “Center/Periphery in the Rule and Culture of the Habsburg Monarchy 1867–1918” at the Vienna University in January 2006. She is currently working with a project on the Europeanization in the Ukraine.

(hryaban@gmx.net)
TURKISH LACE
Constructing Modernities and Authenticities

Hilje van der Horst

Turkish domesticity is often associated with lace doilies. While this decoration practice is diminishing, it can still be encountered in a large number of Turkish Dutch houses in the Netherlands. However, Turkish lace appears in a variety of other settings in the Netherlands as well, such as shops and exhibition spaces. In these diverse settings a wide variety of actors give it meaning. While notions of modernity, tradition and authenticity are present in all settings, they are understood in conflicting ways. Non-Turkish actors, handling this lace, co-define it, as well as a broader concept of Turkishness.

Keywords: Turkish migrants, lace, material culture, authenticity, modernity