From “Rethinking History” to “Rethinking Identity”
Cultural Belonging and Migration in the Ukraine
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In this text, I will describe relevant negotiations on cultural belonging and national membership with the current situation in the Ukraine and Bukowina. Old and new migration movements have a big impact on these negotiations and I therefore selected them as a central theme. I explain how definitions of “the own” and “the other” function as orientations in the transformation of societies, and a national identity is installed through a mechanism of “rethinking history”. Migration in the Ukraine goes two ways these days: the so-called “transnational” migration on the one hand, and on the other hand, migration that is influenced by the idea of a historical home. To illustrate these two different structures and what consequences they have on the understandings of identity, I concentrate on the discursive assumptions and contrasting natures of the two forms of migration. My thesis is that the analyzed process of “rethinking identity” can not only be found in the Ukraine, but is a new development Europe-wide, which results in conflicts within one society, not between them.

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In the following text I would like to comment on a process, which today can be observed in a state of contradictory development all over Europe. It is not my aim to deliver a complete history on migration in the Ukraine and Bukowina, nor is it to analyze the process of nation building in detail. My intention is to show the impact of a changing migration on negotiations of cultural belonging. Therefore, discourses and practices of re-nationalization and transnationalization and re-territorialization and de-territorialization are the foundations for the main focus. The Bukowina in the Ukraine was chosen as an example for this text, because the Ukraine is a very young nation. It is at present in the process of forming its national identity, which is something of a contradictory process towards transnational developments. In this situation, ascriptions of “the own” and “the other” are becoming more of a public field that is intensively fought and argued over. The text is written in two contexts: Field observations during a research excursion to the Bukowina that was planned and realized by the Institute of European Ethnology of the University of Vienna in May 2003. Secondly, I base some general interpretations on national identity and self-assessment in the Ukraine on previous notable research that covers nationalism, identity building and cultural renewal in transformation and post-socialistic societies. The Ukraine is part of the Eastern European transformation societies. It is therefore subject to economical and political change, and also drastic cultural and social change. As Christoph von Werth explained, there is a need for an ultimate break with the past in order to bring about political alteration and cultural renewal on all levels. The structural order of things is being changed in favor of reaching a common sense and understanding of the country’s future. In this scenario, there are basically three different frameworks for the painting of the future. The first of these is the orientation of the pro-communist era under Austrian influence. The second is the connection to an idealized
communist past with a socialist system. And the third framework is the alignment with the European West (von Werdt 2000). These three frameworks for transformation are to be found at varying levels of intensity in the different regions of the Ukraine, and can exist side-by-side or stand-alone. Orientation to the pro-communist era and alignment with a European West are found mostly in the Bukowina.

Definitions of “the Own” and “the Other” as Orientations in Transformation Processes

Allow me to illustrate what is described with two examples. In 1992, the Bukowina center at the university in Cernowitz, whose main purpose is to re-appraise the time under Russian leadership, was founded. For the leader of the Bukowina center, Mr. Pantschuk, the Ukraine is a state that lost its own identity under the rule of different powers. The Ukraine has been an independent nation for only twelve years, and he explains that it is very important for such a young state to define a new national identity and national culture. The leading vision for which the country should strive is based on an understanding of who Ukrainians are, how the Ukrainian people should be and which values, ideals and mentalities they adhere to. His narrative of the Bukowian past is dominated by descriptions of breaks and changes, and he argues that the historical period under Austrian rule can develop into the leading vision for the future society. He sees himself as one of the “original Bukowians” who were already in the Bukowina when “the Austrians built the first stone houses. And now we have to transport the heritage of a tolerant understanding into the modern state.” Through ascriptions of “the own” and “the other,” the break with the past mainly focuses on when Bukowina separated itself from the Russian era. In Mr. Pantschuk’s interpretation, the new settlers that came from the East into the country under Russian rule in 1944 appeared to be part of the “russification” per se. These “new Bukowians” did not know the region while it was under the power of Austrian leadership, so “they also did not know what the Bukowina was and what it meant to live here.” They had different concepts of society, other moral values and symbolic rituals for their community – they where “the others”. “It was a terrible time,” Mr. Pantschuk says, and today it should be the task for every ‘original Bukowian,’ as a real Bukowian, to tell the youth about events in history and to create a new framework for a future society under the flag of an Austrian-tolerant influence. The divide into “original Bukowians” and “new Bukowians” is very important in his explanations of the country’s history. By drawing a line between real and false, he puts “the own” into place and characterizes it. In doing so, historical events legitimize the orientation of the Austria of Franz Joseph, which means it strives to bring the transformation process and current politics in line with democracy. The demand that the “original Bukowians” want to have “the Bukowina, as it historically always was”, illustrates the wish to persuade changing processes in more a liberal direction.

On a different level, the second example describes the orientation of transformation processes in alignment with the European West. I would now like to discuss a daily life conversation I experienced, which is contrary to the narrative of Mr. Pantschuk, who was working, researching and analyzing these matters for almost a lifetime. From it, I found an explanation of how ideas of “the own” and “the other” play a constitutive role in the alignment towards the European West. In Cernowitz, two young female students of international politics tell me in confidence, “The Ukraine is the centre of Europe.” This statement is not at all a single phenomenon, but can indeed be found quite often in every day life conversations, because Europe is seen as a geographical region running as far out as the Ural Mountains. But in this argument of the two students, the main interest does not centre on geographical questions, but rather it defines the belonging to Europe (the economically strong and socially safe continent) through territorial and cultural terms. Andreas Kappeler showed very plausibly in his book about national movement in the Ukraine how the perception of what the East is and what the West is changes, and how it also depends on one’s point of view. Germany considers itself in the heart of Europe, with its highly symbolic ruins of the former wall
between East and West in Berlin. Vienna's self-portrait includes itself as being at the centre of Europe as well, with the "free west" and the EU on the one side, and Turkey, along with a "backward Eastern Europe" on the other. Poland also sees itself on the cutting edge: the catholic Occident contra Russia, orthodoxy and despotism. "But also, a lot of Russians see themselves between East and West: the West, which is the rest of Europe, is shared Christianity and the modern age. The East means Asia, the Steppes, Islam, tartars and the yellow danger which Russia was saving Europe from" (Kappeler 2003: 15). In brief, East and West are all a matter of perspective. In the Ukraine, negotiations about East and West are very diverse, because ideas in Cornwall are very different to those in Kiev or Odessa. The two young women are appalled when they read the indictment "small Asia" in relation to their own region. This quote does not fit with their understanding of themselves. They exclaim, "The East – that is not us!" I personally am not appalled by their opinion, but I am a little surprised. Being a German woman with my own pictures of "the other," I do think of the Ukraine as being part of "the East." When asked, "And where is the East for you?" their response was, "In Asia or in Turkey. Everybody knows that people are a bit behind times there. The Moslems have more than one wife, and are therefore completely non-European." Pertaining to the definition of Turkey as being "non-European," one can sense the wish to define one's own national identity, which is oriented more towards the European West in order to guide the future developments of the country. One wants to be modern, progressive and forward-looking, or simply – European! And again, historical events legitimize this orientation. Both of the students say, "We fought the Turkish already in 1621 and defended Europe against them. We are historically part of Europe, because we showed solidarity with them." They refer here to an historical event, which took place in the Dnistr region. Guests can still get an impression of the event in a small exhibition within the grounds of the city of Chotyn, which is supposed to be one thousand years old. The exhibition shows, next to a few objects of the rural life in the Ukraine, an impressive painting in which the big battle of Chotyn is represented. Today, myths and legends of the Ukraine as a nation of the Christian West are based around this battle in which the Slavic armed forces fought the Turks in 1621 and stopped them from marching into Europe. The imagination of the Ukrainian people as being savers of a European peace is a clear-cut fencing-off from "the East." In connection with Europe, their imagination reflects the following future aim: to be the outer border of the EU one day and not be in front of its gates, which is where it stands at the moment.

From the above examples, I can illustrate three things very clearly. Firstly, transformation processes towards political alteration and cultural renewal orient themselves among others through definitions of "the own" and "the other," and in turn influence orders of society. Secondly, breaking with the past and seeking legitimacy of the new social order is established by a "production of cultural heritage". This fact states less about the truth of particular definitions of national identity or the correctness of certain orientations for transformation processes, and more about the fact that definitions of national culture, belonging and leading perspectives for the future in transformation societies function through a symbolic process of "rethinking history" (Jenkins 1995). And thirdly, one could observe that past history, current national culture and intended orientations are felt, articulated and 'defended' as an individual sense of belonging in a personal manner.

Migration History: Systematic Resettlement as a Political Strategy

The migration history of the Ukraine tells a story about a country in movement. Emigration and immigration produced a highly mixed, heterogenic population in which the defining of "the own" and "the other" was not always an easy thing to do.1 Historically, there were two main reasons for migration in today's Ukraine: the exploration of unknown areas, and political reasons. Around 1900, the first wave of migration caught on in the Ukraine. About 650,000 so-called "fur carriers" left the West (then part of
Austria–Hungary) and headed towards Canada and the USA persuaded by the idea of conquering new regions and finding a better life. In addition, 1.6 million people left Central and East Ukraine (then part of the Russian Empire) and went to the North Caucasus, South Ural and Kazakhstan with the same expectations. In brief, the exploration of unknown areas went hand-in-hand with the prospect of new chances in life and better financial possibilities. Politically motivated migration results in the immigration of “the own,” at least in the case of the leading power. The emigration of “the other,” or those who became “the other,” occurs through redefinition. This import of “the own” and export of “the other” is called “systematic resettlement” and it works as a political strategy to incorporate a territory. Systematic resettlement as a practice of migration is legalized through the argumentation of cultural and ethnic belonging, and therefore has a big impact on the understandings of “the own” and “the other” as nationally defined categories. In the following, I am going to describe this principle of systematic resettlement using the migration history of the Bukowina as an example. It is, however, important to mention that this principle is valid for other regions in the Ukraine as well. For example, fully integrated former Polish people were sent back to their “home county” from the region of Zokalin Galicia. Also, supposed “real” Ukrainians returned to the Ukraine, because their ancestors came from there even though they were already residents in Poland for many generations.

During the First World War, thousands left the Bukowina for official or military duties in foreign positions to fulfill “civil tasks” in the Eastern border territory, and to also presumably get away from the war-zone. When the war was over in 1918, the area of today’s Bukowina became Romanian for the next twenty-two years (Hausleitner 2001). This caused an immense drift of refugees in the first few years after 1918. Around 200,000 people travelled towards the West, because they saw their life threatened in the Bukowina. To fill increasing gaps and to rebuild and reform the region culturally, the Romanian government sent Romanian people into the region. Also, to infiltrate their own values and morals, their “own” political, social and cultural ideas, they brought with them their own people. In essence, they practiced systematic resettlement as a political strategy. The first signs of this principle were also in place under the leadership of the Habsburgs, but because of tolerant politics, there was hardly any need for forced migration from the region and one cannot speak of a systematic resettlement in the political sense. Only under the Romanian leadership is the resettlement, or the importation of the culturally “own” and the exportation the culturally “other,” becoming a systematic mechanism that is used as a political strategy. This political strategy is based on the assumption that the culturally “own” people, or those who are seen as owners of a national culture with particular values, characteristics, features and loyalties, are transforming the territory. People transform the region into one that is culturally their “own,” and therefore belongs to “them.” The provided congruency from individual, culture and territory is incorporating the region as culturally “theirs,” and at the same time, this congruency is reproduced by the process of systematic resettlement, because people are sent to places where, it is said, they always belonged.

The Russian leaders that took over power in 1942 practiced the principle of systematic resettlement and the assumption behind it even further. The population in the Bukowina got separated, remixed, de-territorialized and re-territorialized again. With the invasion of the Wehrmacht in 1936, another big wave of migration followed between 1941 and 1944. Millions of members of the important and influential minority of Jewish people were excluded and threatened so much that they had to flee (Pohl 1997). From 1939 until 1955, many rich farmers, clergyman and intellectuals were resettled in the course of the “sovietization” and through numerous migrations. The composition of the population therefore changed to include more Azerbajiani, Uzbekistani, Turkmenistani, Tajikistani and Armenians. During this time, the "original Bukowanians”, whose origins were namely German, Chechen, Ukrainian, Polish and Tartars, immigrated to places all over the world. They were sent back to their “origin”, which was not the home with social relationships
they once knew, but rather it was an imagined home. If they refused to leave, many were expelled from the country. Through the instrumentalization of cultural belonging, an imagination and interpretation of home was installed that defined an inherited traditional place for everybody in the world – the own nation. It is in the own nation where people have their ethnic roots, their national culture and their cultural belonging. Even if that does not reflect the current social behaviour or sense of belonging, the “nation as home” is politically very useful to justify migration, resettlement and territorial exclusion. “The main task of the migration policy of the USSR was to remix a population with different ethnic groups, to destroy traditional, cultural and personal connections through resettlement and build a new over-national common ground for the ‘Soviet people’” (Malinovska 1996: 11). Consequently, the systematic resettlement was indeed not a “bringing back” of people to their origin. It was legalized through the argument of cultural belonging, and was in fact a political project with the aim to produce one unified nation. Ihor Czechowskyi describes the effect that the permanent changes of the political, economical and cultural situations of different ruling powers had on the definitions of “the own” and “the other” in the Bukowina: “It is very difficult to transform the loss into a win when the ‘not us’ from yesterday are becoming the ‘us’ all of a sudden, and the other way around, such as when leaders are becoming ‘enemies’ and when a language that was not so long ago official is changing into a target for mockery. For which nation, which language, which beliefs, for whose insignia should you play for?” (Czechowskyi 2002:363). The “nation as home” was constructed by the cultural practice and mechanism of systematic resettlement. Along with it, the idea of the congruency from individual, culture and territory was reproduced over generations.

But, the outcome was far away from one unified, national culture and homogeneous population with similar ideas of “the own” and “the other,” because the same method was used by different powers. The political project to homogenize the population and to install one unified national culture failed, and whilst the principle of systematic resettlement was a political strategy for varied leaders, a mixed heterogeneous population with varying ideas about belonging and national identity arose. These different imaginations about “the own” and “the other” still co-exist with each other today. The idea of the congruency from individual, culture and territory was pushed through, but with what individual, with which national culture and with what territory should there be a connection? This stays questionable and negotiable even today.

**Past Migration Consequences**

Previous research covering nationalism, identity building and cultural renewal showed that the production of a national identity and national culture can have different orientations in transformation and post-socialistic societies, but they are basically all working through the representations of cultural heritage as the true history (Wanner 1998, Goehrke/Gills 2000, Bahlcke 2002). The orientation of future developments for a national culture, which is based on representations of cultural heritage, is characteristic for these countries. “Rethinking history” is used to establish the nation as a constitutive category in the new society. This means that the country’s past is newly interpreted. New meaning is given to historic events, symbolic value is put on dates, memory function is produced through locations as “join de memoires” (Nora 1990), history books are rewritten and new national heroes are invented. The whole process of reinterpretting the country’s past is called “rethinking history”, and this method has one aim only: to give the impression that there is something like historical continuity, and a continuity that can be told in a automatical narrative today. Historical continuity lends legitimacy and reinforces the unified national culture as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) that points the way for concepts of belonging and collective experiences within the borders of one nation state. Of course there are, as I illustrated before, different ideas about cultural heritage and which kind of national identity and national culture should be adopted in the Ukraine. The competition between various ideas induces
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conflicts that are mostly negotiated above the ascribing of “the own” and “the other”. As one can read in Catherine Wanner’s expositions concerning history and identity in the post-soviet Ukraine, the State is subject to essential challenges. Referring to the Russian part of its population, today’s Ukraine is characterized as being the home for the largest Russian Diaspora. These are former Russians who are Ukrainian citizens now. At the same time, almost one third of the population is or sees itself as “russified” or “denationalised”. Through these two contradictory factors, ascriptions of “the own” and “the other” are becoming a public field in the current situation. “Many look to the past to understand the present and to shape the future. Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians tend to see their Russian-speaking Ukrainian brethren as “victims” of oppressive imperial and Soviet cultural politics. ‘Russified’ Ukrainians, on the other hand, often feel that through intermarriage, mobility, and the media, they freely assimilated to Russian culture” (Wanner 1998: xix). These are only the different interpretations of cultural belonging and definitions of “the other” within the discussions about being Russian. The unity of the nation, especially the culturally imagined nation, is more than ever threatened if one takes religious and national differentiations into account.

In the process of “rethinking history”, with the aim to redefine “the own” and “the other” and to put through a unified national culture, the assertion of an historical home is of decisive importance. Discussions about the historical home seem to be distinguishing for the process of nation building in the Ukraine. These discussions support the “discourse of the national”, which produces a “symbolical linking between history, past and present politics” (Niedermüller 1997: 247). Historical home means to have cultural “roots”, to have traditions and continuity, to have stability of the national culture and to have an identification with it. It means to have security within the interpretive system. The sense of belonging culturally to a “nation as home” comes along with an understanding of “the own” and “the other”. These categories have their use in constructing and reproducing one shared idea about national identity, cultural belonging and one national culture out of all the diverse imaginations. And in this scenario, national culture and an understanding of “the own” and “the other” confirm each other and seem to be the unquestionable truth.

I cannot show in this text exactly how the idea of a national culture was modeled in the Ukraine and how it rearranged society. But, it should have appeared obvious that imaginations of “the own” and “the other” are produced through the mechanism of “rethinking history”. They reinforce an understanding of cultural belonging that is attached to the “nation as home”. In this production of the “nation as home”, the history of migration played a very important part. It mixed the ethnical composition of the population and restructured and reorganized ideas of “the own” and “the other”, and is therefore subject to the “discourse of the national” itself. Migration movements are becoming a question of national identity and cultural belonging in the redefinition of the national culture, because they both doubt and reproduce understandings of the “historical home”.

National identity, as a symbolically produced category, is not only dependent on the production of historical continuity and the unity of the “imagined community”, but it also depends on being a meaningful element for the private person. National identity gives the individual a feeling of belonging, an understanding of where his or her historical home is and where his or her “roots” are. It gives an explanation to what is worth fighting for and what one should personally chose as the direction for the future. Through the national identity, the individual is bound to the nation, and negotiations, discussions and representations of national culture are intended to give a template for the sense of belonging. Cultural belonging as an identification with a national identity gives the single person a cultural home, or a place, where he or she belongs. This is to show that the political strategy is no longer to resettle people, but to install a national identity in order to reterritorialize culture. Because the national identity comes along with an emotional feeling of belonging, which in turn fuels migration. Migration does not need to be forced any more, because the political strategy is etched in the
person’s individual life. There, it emerges as a sense of cultural belonging and personal identification with an “own” culture. It is just as deeply rooted in the character of a person as it is in the territory in which the person lives. Accordingly, a lot of people today relate “the own” to German, Austrian or Russian history, because that is where they see their “cultural roots”. Which does not mean that this is where they also see their “cultural home”. This is for most people the Ukraine itself. But, to give the “cultural home” some new content, they look back into the past and produce a cultural heritage.

These days, historical migration movements give meaning to the discussions about “the own” and “the other” in two different ways. On the one hand, migration fulfills its task by letting the national “own” become a reality of a national culture, and therefore feeds the “national memory” (Zolner 2000) in exactly the same way that “rethinking history” does. In the interpretation, migration flows seem to re-establish what was naturally given anyway: the feeling of culturally belonging to a territory. On the other hand, migration built a consciousness concerning the fact that there are different competing ideas about ethnic and cultural belongings, for which one can take a position when it comes to the definition of the nation as a cultural heritage. Both the heterogeneity of the population and the idea of a “historical home” are stored in the “collective memory” (Irwin-Zarecka 1994). This means that migration is part of the “national memory” and of the “collective memory” at the same time. They also have different meanings, which makes it even more confusing in some discussions about cultural belonging. My point here is that the feeling of cultural belonging is not just simply there and is far removed from being natural. Realistically speaking, it is forcefully installed in the society through migration history and the mechanism of a systematic import of “the own” and an export of “the other”. Today, this feeling of belonging is saying more about the instrumentalization of cultural differences as a political strategy than about the question of where people belong.

If differentiations of “the own” and “the other” are instrumentaled to a national culture with political relevance, nationalism goes as far as Catherine Wanner describes: “The past takes on a marked salience when meaning, categories, and concepts in the present appear opaque. The past becomes a resource used to forge meaning in the present. [...] I have argued in this book that the unifying phase of nationalism as it is unfolding in post-Soviet Ukraine has hinged on attempts to create a historically based sense of national identity out of the ruins of an internationalist socialist culture” (Wanner 1991:203). The situation is simply not explained with a “rising nationalism”, which was always there and was just waiting to rise again from the bottom of a nationalistic mentality. The political instrumentalization of cultural differences signifies a re-nationalization, in which the “nation as a home”, based on a continuing history and cultural heritage, is used as an argument. Cultural belonging cannot be thought of without the instrumentalization of it, and therefore arguments about cultural belonging are never just about a feeling. They are about politics and they are about how someone longs to see the new Ukrainian society in the future. It is therefore not the only aim in daily life conversations to find out whose vision is the “true” one. It is more likely that the discussions about cultural heritage and the national culture are symbolic. They are a political competition about the power to define the new society, its cultural values, social behavior and moral codes. Conflicts concerning cultural belonging are rarely about the love of the truth of their advocates, but about authority, power and influence.

New Migration Developments: From Historical Home to Transnational Migration

Highly influenced by migration history, there are two contradictory tendencies within new migration movements in the Ukraine today. On the one hand, the discourse of an “historical home” is still very alive, as we see above, and on the other hand, new patterns of transnational migration are coming into place. With the collapse of the USSR in the beginning of the nineties, the Ukraine became an independent state in 1992. The political independency was changing migration flows immediately, and
especially emigration conspicuously retrogrades. There are no more enrolments from abroad and the possibility of a democratic process triggers hopes for a better life in the Ukraine. People expect a stable political situation, a right to a say and an economic upswing, which in turn seeks immigration. Still, each year about 50,000 people left the Ukraine and head towards the West (above all, to Israel, the United States and Germany). But, on the bottom line, immigration was much stronger than emigration in the early 90s. In 1992, the biggest immigrant group, the so-called “repatriates,” legitimized their migration and cultural belonging to the Ukraine in an historical home. They argued the same way as governments did, in that differentiations of understanding of “the own” and “the other” are forming a national culture with political relevance. Repatriates, or their ancestors, were originally from the Ukraine and left for a number of reasons to different places and wanted to return to the Ukraine, their origin, when it was politically stable. This development concerned first of all the Germans and Crimean Tartars, as well as returning workers from Russia. They all referred to their cultural and national affiliation as a base for the current argument and feeling of cultural belonging that justifies the migration. Without a doubt, there were also some who just used the argument of the historical home, while their reasons were more likely to escape hardship and lack of opportunities from whence they came.

The historical migration movements did not only influence the national and collective memory in the country and played a role in debates about the historical home, but they also evolved so that people actually moved away from the Ukraine. Migrants left and settled in other places all around the world. 1994 and 1995 were economically very difficult years, and newfound hopes broke or were questioned. Ideas of a better life in the West were falling on fecund ground. The repatriation was almost finished and the emigration due to economical reasons rose suddenly. At the beginning of the nineties, the migration of the last hundred years evolved into a widespread Diaspora, which provided bridgeheads and networks for newly arriving migrants.

In 1994, this Diaspora accounted for two million people in the USA, one million in Canada, 650,000 members in South America, 4.5 million in the USSR, one million in Kazakhstan and 600,000 people in Moldova. This exceeding potential of networks is dominating the direction of transnational migration today.

These days, more and more people for whatever reason leave their home country, and a new dynamic of de-territorialization arises. Not only in the Ukraine and in Europe, but also all over the world, community networks are constructing “global ethnic spaces” (Appadurai 1998:38) in which traditional ideas of a connection between space and cultural reproduction break open. The congruency of individual, culture and territory falls partly apart, and national identity is newly revised. The decisive factor in these developments is less the fact that “tensions between the global and the local […] are the prime force of the production of cultural identity today” (Appadurai 1998:36), but that fantasy and “social imaginations” (Appadurai 1996) are becoming a social practice (Appadurai 1998:22). In brief, ideas and imaginations about what’s possible for the individual – who to be, where to go and what to reach in life are actually moving people. These “social imaginations” are not just pictures from another world that are far out of reach anyway, but rather they are the “fuel for action”. People do think their fantasies will realistically come true, so they are prepared to do things in order to transform the imagination into reality. This process is not naive or unrealistic. Instead, it creates a new social practice. Maybe experiences hold a dissonant reality in relation to the original idea, but never the less the social practice to move that is fueled by “social imaginations” creates a new reality of social life. The individual is guided by different possibilities that tighten the net of opportunities all over the globe. “Social imaginations” can produce a social sphere in which alternative verities about the connection between spaces, cultural reproduction and the individual are conceivable.

With the structural changes of migration, new values arise and cultural belonging is rethought, rediscussed and reconstructed. Therefore, migration movements in the first
years of the new republic of the Ukraine, next to the downturn of emigration, are based on new legitimations. There is no politically forced systematic resettlement anymore, as I showed before, and one new legitimation for migration is brought up in the discussions. Exploratory reasons, which were organized amateurishly and solitarily in the past, have altered into a highly organized migration for economical reasons. At the same time, the old legitimating of migration for political reasons, meaning the systematic import of “the own” and export of “the other”, is still argued historically these days. These two forms of differently legitimized migration work in two different ways. On “one side, the political subject is looking for its own place” and takes care to get there (sometimes provided with help of the nation state). As I tried to illustrate before, historical migration had a big impact on these understandings of the own place as the “nation as home,” but now these understandings are no longer politically forced. The individual person feels a cultural belonging and therefore does not need to be brought or resettled anywhere. People make sure themselves that they get to the place where they think they belong. On the other side, people are moving in the opposite direction and turn away from their origin towards new localities out of the hope of finding better economical conditions. I don’t want to claim that these two forms of legitimation are no longer political. But oppositely, I’d like to allege that legitimizing cultural belonging and the lack of economical assurance can both be understood as political decisions.

Now, how are these two different practiced and argued forms of migration connected? The historically argued migration is based on the “discourse of the national” and the economically argued migration is founded on a “discourse of the transnational”. I argued that re-nationalization comes along with the production of a historical home. My thesis now states that transnationalization comes along with the interpretations of present migration movements and the deconstruction of the historical home, so that new ideas of belonging and identity evolve. These interpretations of present migration movements and the deconstruction of cultural belongings constitute the “discourse of the transnational”. Discourses are not simply the public opinion on some subjects, but orders of knowledge. “Discourses administer and regulate social systems of knowledge and access of knowledge, in which the available forms of expert and daily life knowledge are determined. They reason this system of knowledge with moral and ethical arguments that target a social consensus [...]” (Kaschuba 1999:236). The difference within “the own” country, first of all a cultural or an ethnical difference, is also celebrated in the “discourse of the national” in order to produce homogeneity, a national culture and identity. “Nationalism as a distinctively modern cultural form attempts to create a new kind of spatial and mythopoetic metanarrative, one that simultaneously homogenizes the varying narratives of community while, para-doxically, accentuating their difference” (Gupta 1997:191). The concept of “culture” is qualified to construct collective identities. It designates how multifaceted one country is and which different groups all belong to one national culture. And at the same time, it also defines those groups or individuals who are not included in society and the national culture.

The “discourse of the transnational” argues something completely different. In the middle of the seventies, the notion of “transnationality” is at first mentioned in science and is used for economical coherences or technological transfer. To begin with, the notion denominated a sophisticated level of multi-nationality in the course of internationalization (Heise 1987). During the eighties and nineties, the concept occurred increasingly within social and cultural science, where it was used in different coherences. In general, one could destine the least common denominator, or that transnationality designates interaction across national borders. In contrast with the “international”, which describes the exchanges and relationships between nation states, transnationality divines phenomenons that are indicated by an actual, a categorical or an imaginary crossing of borders (Kälble/ Kirsch/ Schmidt-Gering 2002). Ethnical or cultural differences, as much as the understandings of “the own” and “the other”, stem from previous
categories, because people with varying senses of belonging share one social space, which they stretch over national borders. The knowledge system of transnationalism does not contain an historical home. Oppositely, “home”, as much as “culture,” represents a category transformed into something that can exist everywhere (fragmentally produced and overruled) or nowhere (AJ-Ali 2002). “Home” has no meaning for the single person, and is therefore not connected to one place; one nation or one “nation as home” to which someone culturally belongs. The “nation as home” is increasingly questioned in the “discourse of the transnational” and other values like mobility, flexibility and networking are becoming more important. “What the nationalists wanted was a ‘space’ for each ‘race’, or a territorializing of each social identity. What they have got instead […] is a chain of cosmopolitan cities and an increasing proliferation of Diasporas, sub-national and ethnic identities that cannot easily be contained in the nation state system” (Cohen 1996:520).

The cultural and national territorial identity in the “discourse of the national” is articulated as many-sided social, cultural and national identifications in the “discourse of the transnational”. These identifications are overlapping, co-existing or even contrary to each other.

Let us have a closer look at these developments and how they happen in the Ukraine. In the nineties, one could set the beginning of the development of “global ethnic spaces” in the Ukraine. There was a widespread Diaspora and networks all over the world supported newly arriving migrants. The conceivability of a better life in some other place was coming closer and closer through the media and narratives of relatives and friends, which fueled “social imaginations”. It also became obvious that actual and practical crossing of borders rose in the early nineties according to the figures of the ministry of statistics. These figures of migration and crossing of borders increased, because more people applied for “temporary journeys abroad”. Whilst in 1987 there were only 85,000 applications, in 1991 there were already 2.5 million (70% of them to Poland). Unfortunately, the statistics stop in 1993, but the border control pictures an increment of border crossings and also confirms the internationalization of border crossers, especially that of refugees (Chabakc 2000). People are coming from Southeast and East Asia, the Caucasus and Near East, from Africa, Maghreb and Lebanon in order to get into Europe above the Ukraine. They choose some human smuggler or are hocked in trafficking activities that bring them from their country to the Ukraine, and then further to the Balkans, to the Czech Republic or Slovakia. From there, they make their way into the western European countries. The border policy of the Ukraine was liberalized since independence, and in the last ten years the collaboration with neighboring nations was solidified. Never the less, a lot of migrants without papers are coming across the border from Russia, Moldova and White Russia into the Ukraine. And the Ukraine is therefore very often the starting point of a long journey into or across Europe.

But the so-called irregular or “illegal” migration is not the only transnational movement into Europe. People are also coming for employment reasons from all over the world. They come as computer experts from India to Germany, as doctors from Russia to Poland and as scientists from South Africa to France. This is, of course, a completely different form of migration, because people have legal papers and no struggle with the border control. They are warmly welcomed in the country to strengthen the “location factor” in international competition, and so that the country can be seen as being tolerant and multicultural. So, it is the socially weak and poor ones who are excluded from the negotiations about who is allowed to get into Europe and those who must stay outside. For the Ukraine, both kinds of migrants are leaving: well-educated ones and socially weak ones, both of whom practice transnational migration. Therefore, the population subsided in the Ukraine from 52 million people in 1993 to 47 million today. A lot of young people are searching their luck abroad and are coming back to leave again, so that the country is losing its mainspring. It is indeed no wonder that with a general monthly income of 30 Euros, low pensions, dependency on relatives in the countryside and blooming “social imaginations”
of a better life in the West that the young are leaving the Ukraine. These developments show that people are still making their way to Diaspora members or relatives abroad to stay there and build up a new life. But more and more people are not actually emigrating, but moving back and forth. They move to a foreign country for some time, come back to the Ukraine and move somewhere else again. These migration movements are creating so-called “transnational social spaces” (Pries 1998).

Stephen Castles and Mark Miller showed how migration rose since the eighties (Castles/Miller 1993: 4), and in the year 1992, the International Migration Organization accounted for one hundred million people living outside their native country. The directions of international migration changed quite a bit since the sixties, from the traditional movements from the North to the South, towards movements from Africa, Asia, South America and Russia to the industrialized regions. After the cold war the feared stream from the East did not arrive in Europe, but a multi-layered system of commuter traffic is slowly coming into being. An expanding international labor market for highly qualified workers functions as a multiplication factor for transnational migration movements, and leaves some countries with a brain drain. Global cities as centers of production, capital investment and “places of hybridism” (Sassen 2001) are magnets for working forces, no matter if they’re highly qualified or not. And some authors like Ludger Pries and others think it is justifiable to speak about a new era of migration (Pries 1998; Castles/Miller 1993). Next to changes regarding quantity and quality, as much as destination routes and reasons of migration, another attending phenomenon of the new transnational migration is recognized. This is the accrement of “transnational social spaces”. These are characterized by transnationality in a twin sense. On the one hand, spaces as ways, rivers or passages develop between the places of migration, and can be used by all sorts of people. On the other hand, spaces are locations, places or niches, which are minted by the attendance of several nationalities. This means that common explanation patterns are no longer sufficient enough. There is no longer “a procedure of sallying, arriving and (at least in the second generation) integrating in the host country [...]. The phenomenon is also not properly explained as a process of building a new ethnic minority or Diaspora [...]. In point of fact, new social realities (norms for actions, cultural environment, local economic settings, social networks, etc.) are built, which transform the former social context of the state of origin and the state of arrival qualitatively. They also stretch themselves as new social spaces in between and above these two contexts” (Pries 1998: 63). In brief, the individual can have social relations with several localities. People commute over national borders and therefore create connections between the visited places. They are neither tourists, who leave after some time and return to their home country, nor are they migrants who integrate more or less in the new society in order to stay steadily. With their presence in two or more social contexts, they are “transmigrants”.

All together, the Ukraine is still partially incomplete in its migration control through legislative and administrative structures. Laws and rules concerning the migration were carried out slowly in the last ten years and came along with the endeavor to install structured deportation machinery. With the continuing process of Europeanization and the Ukraine standing on Europe’s doorstep, migration and its control are becoming more and more important. Currently, it can take up to six months to get a Ukrainian passport in order to stop people from leaving and there are serious concerns about the future developments. International organizations are working on an “institution-building” with the government and questions about migration and refugees are cogitated (Forschungsgesellschaft Flucht und Migration 1997). Not to mention the difficulties of a nation that is still in the building-up process, and therefore can hardly cope with questioning nation state principles. National and cultural identifications break open in favor of alternative ideas that develop in the “transnational social spaces”. What happens to the understanding of identity and identifications in this contradictory expansion of social, cultural, political and economical life?
New Migration Consequences

If one understands the discourses about nation, culture and belonging as organizations of space that produce ways and localities as “transnational social spaces,” then transnationalism appears to be the countermovement to the conventional national organizations of space. Space is getting restructured in an alternative way and this restructuring retroacts the understandings of cultural belonging and identity. New identifications, or at least the possibility to differ from one national identity and the reproduction of “the own” as culturally belonging to a national culture, are given (Gupta/Ferguson 1997). As a characterization of the new spaces, which are currently arising all over Europe and not just in the Ukraine (meaning across the Ukraine and neighboring states), one can stress two points. A high level of specifying networks and transnationalism, in the twin sense as I explained before, both open up ideas and ascriptions of “the own” and “the other.” The attempt to produce one emotionally bound nation as a collective experience through representations of a cultural heritage and the process of “rethinking history” is in discord with the development of “transnational social spaces”. Therefore, different understandings of identity, belonging and nation exist in one country. And these are not just differences about which nation someone feels for or belongs to, but about the whole concept of belonging. Obviously, by courtesy of people from various national countries using ways and localities mutually, a new dynamic takes place in the “transnational social spaces.” This dynamic has the potential to rethink cultural, social, political and economical belongings and negotiations, and to reinterpretate them in new ways. In these new spaces, belongings are still often articulated as a national matter, but through a common social practice, alternate thinking models and templates for solidarity, values and ethic patterns grow. Traditional understandings of a “nation as home” and former definitions of “the own” and “the other” are convulsed, which accrues an essential contradiction. On the one side, it is a matter of fact that “the imagination of community and society [...] functions through codes of inclusion and exclusion” (1mhof 2002). And on the other side, these codes are questioned and threatened by transnational migration and the new developments of “transnational social spaces.”

The new forms of migration are bringing about a dialectic field between the “discourse of the national” and the “discourse of the transnational”, and this is what makes the determination of one unified national culture very difficult. Insecurities about the value and use of cultural belonging in the old sense and about where to go, what to do and who to be are taking over. New identities arise and “such identities escape from either-or classification and become defined more by a logic of “both-and-and,” in which the subject shares partial overlapping identities with other similarly constituted decentered subjects that inhabit reticular social forms” (Kearny 1995:558). Hybrid, multiple or multilocal identities bulge out, and those identification concepts which are based on the congruency of individual, culture and territory, don’t seem to meet reality anymore. The success story of the nation state as the founder of identity suffers through the new “transnational social spaces” of the transnational migration. New social practices and alternative models of identification irritate national understandings of belonging, and therefore new ideas about belonging are developing in the process of “rethinking identity”. These new ideas still see people as citizens of nation states and don’t deny their national membership, but they also see people as members in other small or big units of belonging. There is not only one national culture and one national identity, but also rather a concept of belonging as a multiple subject who is a member of diverse collectives. If transnational migration processes irritate the collective founding identities of a nation, then new answers need to be found to the question of how to deal with the fact of not having an unequivocal national belonging as a cultural identity. Let’s not forget that new identifications can be experienced differently. The cultural and social attendance in two or more places and contexts mean different things for different people. For some, it might be enrichment and for others it is a trigger of insecurity and fear. There are no rules, and the perception of the situation
is as multiple as the people are: they can stick with the “discourse of the national” or be against it, and they can have resistance against the “discourse of the transnational” or be in line with it. Or, they can make up their own mixture of different arguments of both the discourses.

In this specific situation, one can comprehend developments all over Europe, which are of importance for all nation states. On the one hand, there are transnational movements in migration, economy, institutions, finances, plus social and business networks. On the other hand, there are efforts to refasten the nation state, and to secure its authority, sovereignty and power. The strengthening principles of the nation state contradict the dissolving ones. The widespread picture in Europe from a people as one “Volkskörper”, the leviathan as one unified nation, and a single body with a special character and mentality, is questionable. And as we could see from the example of the Ukraine, contradictory forces are tugging on some states. In the Ukraine the attempt to import “the own” and export “the other” (based on a national culture and identity) failed and switched completely, because it was practiced by different political powers. Not one unified nation comes out of this history, but a country with a heterogenic population that has varying and sometimes competing ideas about cultural belonging and who “the other” is. This heterogenic population is confronted with the phenomenon of transnational movements, which mixes the understanding and negotiations of cultural belonging up even more. “The own” in cultural terms or as a national culture is not existent in the “discourse of the transnational”, and therefore a national identity needs to be reproduced in the “discourse of the national” to delimitate the putative “other”. This might explain targets of nationalistic oriented groups today to some extent, but the fundamental problem cannot be solved. In a nation state with varying imaginations of social, cultural and economic belongings, everybody fights against another “the other”. And dissociations, as well as processes of exclusion, are not only taking place at the national borders, but amidst society.

The two described discourses of the national and transnational both produce a discursive space that is colliding in the different ways of behavior and thinking. Both discourses are trying to put their truths through to a social reality in order to gain as much control and power in society as they can. Like we saw at the beginning of the text, the goal of some Bukowianians is to define a cultural belonging to Europe above the territorial and historical connection. And this is only one way amongst a few that could be used to guide future orientations. But, in all European states we can find the tendency that the linkage between the individual, cultural and territorial belonging breaks open in the process of de-territorialization. Contemporaneously, this linkage gets reproduced in negotiations about “the own” and “the other” in the process of re-territorialization. The process of “rethinking history” is not to be found in all states. Most of the European states already enact a long tradition of their national references. But, I would like to add that in almost all states one can observe transnational migration and other transnational movements that have consequences on the understanding of cultural belonging and affiliation. “Rethinking identity” is a European-wide process that takes part in the dialectic field of renationalization and transnationalization, in between the “discourse of the national” and the “discourse of the transnational.”

Notes

1. Further information about migration in the Ukraine of single ethnic groups or specific themes can be found in the three institutions for research about migration in Kiev: National Institute for Strategic research of the Ukraine, Centre for population studies at the national University in Kiev (www.univ.kiev.ua), Section for working migration and socio-economic prediction of working forces at the research centre for employment and labour market problems.

2. The following statistics are from the study by Olena Malinovska: Migration und Migrationspolitik in der Ukraine nach 1991. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien. Köln 1996. The numbers and statistics in this source are taken from the main source of the ministry for statistics in the Ukraine. They are to be taken with circumspection, because some of them rely on documents and not on real entry in or exit out of the country and are therefore unreliable.
References


