Cultural Sharing and Cultural Diversity
Doing Interpretive Analysis in a Modern Complex Society

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In the ethnological and anthropological literature there are many good ethnographic studies of entities like local communities, class cultures, ethnic groups, particular institutions or age groups. But these studies are seldom anchored in a systematic theory of the total socio-cultural order. What we need are good models of the interrelations between specific forms of life. Based on several stints of fieldwork among different groups of urban working-class families in Norway, this paper attempts to make a systematic argument for the analysis of overarching cultural categories and their interrelations. Such overarching categories help organize, justify and legitimate the social, economic and cultural diversity that may be observed in daily life.

More generally the problem under consideration concerns the relationship between contextualized ethnography and interpretations of comprehensive frameworks of implicit meanings in a modern large scale society. It is argued in the paper that this problem should not be phrased as a question of “generalization” of qualitative analysis. Such a phrasing very quickly leads to questions of sampling and boundaries which make anthropologists and European ethnologists look like bad survey sociologists. Instead the problem is rephrased as one of the “range”, “extent”, “era and area of relative power” of our interpretations.

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Introduction

The question I will address in this paper is the question of part and whole in the analysis of modern Western societies. Anthropologists and European ethnologists working in these societies easily talk about subcultures and partcultures. When they, like David Schneider (1968, 1976) and Louis Dumont (1970, 1975, 1986) conceptualize Western cultures as wholes, this is generally regarded as highly problematical. In my view the conceptualization of the part should be seen as equally problematical as the conceptualization of the whole, because it is not possible to deal analytically with the part without having at least some implicit ideas about the nature of the whole. It is the relation between part and whole which is the topic of this paper, and the more specific question I ask is how to handle analytically cultural diversity and contest as well as cultural sharing and unity. There is a tendency for scholars to treat cultural material as if it is either shared and stable or constantly emerging and contested. While analyses of “traditional” societies have tended to see them as uniform and stable, analyses of “modern” large-scale and complex societies have tended to see them as being full of differences and strife. There is thus a profound need to get a better analytical grasp of the cultural differences and struggles in “traditional” societies as well as of the shared aspects of “modern” societies. And since the distinction between traditional and modern societies has
always been far too crude, and in addition is becoming less and less valid, there exists a general need to handle analytically the fact that cultural ideas and values may be simultaneously both shared and stable as well as negotiated and emerging.

In order to give the abstract methodological argument a concrete point of reference, I will start out by telling two stories. Both stories are based on participant observation with an emphasis on the word participant. My first anthropological fieldwork took place in an aged central city working-class neighborhood in Bergen, the second largest town in Norway (Gullestad 1979, 1985). Compared to other neighborhoods, this neighborhood lacked a great deal: The inhabitants had less education, fewer telephones, bathrooms and other signs of modern life than the inhabitants of many other neighborhoods. In some places the houses are so close that it is almost possible to water the neighbor’s plants from one’s own window. All the same the inhabitants valued their neighborhood because of the social qualities. Over the years they had developed informal rules and cultural practices in order to relate to each other in physical surroundings that were less than perfect for maintaining the valued degree of privacy, peace and quiet in this region.

Some of these practices could be analyzed as a bundle of functions, each with a primary function plus an associated cloud of secondary functions. The primary function legitimizes the practice. If the primary function becomes less necessary, the practice is generally abandoned, and people often do not discover until it is too late that they also lost the secondary functions.

One of the informal practices that to me epitomizes the ethos of the neighborhood, was to sweep the street in front of one’s house. This was done with an almost ritual regularity before week-ends and holydays. The apparent primary function was to keep the street clean. Since the material and social surroundings were threatened by decay, one important secondary function was to signal respectability and dignity. Another secondary function was to provide regular casual meeting places outside the private home. This is extremely important in Norwegian neighborhoods where there are generally few informal and neutral arenas to meet other people.

In writing up the fieldwork from the old central city neighborhood, I analyzed the ritualized street sweeping as well as a rich variety of other practices as living cultural history. The neighborhood was not only valuable because of the frills and decorations of the houses, but because of the wisdom embedded in the specific forms of life associated with these physical surroundings.

My second field study was an examination of the form of life of young working-class mothers living in relatively new cooperative housing estates (Gullestad 1984). I did not stay in one neighborhood but followed social networks where they led me, using a “snow-ball method”. By that technique I was able to portray a way of life which was not limited to one particular neighborhood. One aim of the analysis was to show that this form of life was not failed middle-class, but had its own rationality. During fieldwork I was, among many other things, fascinated by the quantities of money, time, energy, care, and love which are invested in home decoration. The young women did not make clothes, nor did they make jams and juices like their mothers. But the young couples used many days off for home improvement such as panelling or purchasing furniture. Home-decorating is not done once and for all, but has become a continuous project. One aspect of these activities is expressivity, and this aspect has in my view become more important.

Home-decorating can be seen as a creative way of making statements about identities and social relationships. Many values are expressed through the home, like independence, emotional closeness and wholeness. The young women for instance showed great concern for “style” (stil) and “wholeness” (helhet) when planning their home decoration. The idea of wholeness is actually embodied in the physical arrangement of the home through practices associated with style and taste. In these contexts having “good taste” can be equated with the ability to make a convincing personal presentation of wholeness in terms of a specific style (Gullestad in press d).

The street sweeping and the home decora-
tion craze are obviously partcultural practices. My question is to what extent partcultural practices such as these can also tell us something about the centrality of the home or about the meanings of notions like “peace”, “quiet”, “wholeness” and “style” in Norway. I want to make a systematic argument for the idea that such partcultural practices may contain information about the culture (or mentality) of a wider region, be it Norway, Scandinavia, the Nordic countries or Northern Europe.

Two fundamental questions are related to this issue. One is the question of the epistemological status of such terms as, on the one hand, “local culture”, “subculture”, “partculture”, “class culture”, and “form of life”, and, on the other hand, terms such as “culture” and “culture area”. The other question is to what extent concrete actions in a complex society can be seen as creative instantiations of abstract schemes. More generally the problem under consideration concerns the relationship between contextualized ethnography and cultural interpretations in a modern large scale society. I will argue that the parts do not represent the whole as concrete entities, but only at a certain level of abstraction. Our main task as anthropologists or European ethnologists is to study specific and contextualized cultural practices in time and space. The collection of ethnographic details is the hallmark of our discipline. But I will also argue that in order to really be able to specify the specificity of specific forms of life, we need theoretical frameworks and comprehensive attempts at understanding how forms of life are connected and interrelated in economic terms as well as in cultural terms. In this paper I focus on the cultural aspects.

Converting cultural familiarity into systematic knowledge

This methodological question arose during and after the two field studies. My field experiences first led me to demonstrate that forms of life in Norway are more different than Norwegians are generally willing to believe and that working-class ways of life have a certain consistency and integration. Ways of life that may seem unreasonable and delinquent to the outside mainstream, have a certain rationality, seen in the inside “bottom up” perspective, within the given material, social and cultural preconditions.

However, the work with partcultures gradually led me to another intuition: There are not only differences, but also important common themes, between the forms of life I have studied and between these and the one I was living myself as an educated middle-class person. Such common ideas and values help organize, justify and legitimate the social, economic and cultural diversity that may be observed in daily life. The experiences that brought me to this interpretation are thus based upon using myself as an informant about my own society, and I see these reflections as a part of the process of systematically transforming cultural familiarity into systematic knowledge.

Mentality operationalized as overarching cultural categories

The question still remains how common ideas and values can be operationalized and systematically explored. Like most anthropologists I do not see culture as a specific sector in society, but as an aspect of all social action. Culture is not equivalent to social action but can be analyzed as patterns or schemes for social action that actors constantly produce and reproduce in their daily lives. I am, in other words, not only interested in what people think and do, but also what they think and act with, i.e. the ideas, values, concepts and beliefs that they routinely use as tools for thinking and acting.

Such tools for thinking and acting can further be broken down into one aspect which is inchoate, implicit and generally not contested, and another aspect which is explicit and open to different opinions. This distinction is similar to but not quite the same as the French historians’ discrimination between mentality and ideology. For the French historians of the Annales School mentality is connected to social practice and is transferred unconsciously. It changes slowly and is associated with ordinary
people. Ideologies, on the other hand, are produced first and foremost by the learned elite and may change more quickly. In my approach there is a more dynamic relationship between ideologies and mentality. Firstly, the distinction is best conceived not as a distinction between social groups, but as an analytical distinction between different aspects of the socio-cultural practices of common people as well as elite people. The main difference between elite people and common people is thus not that one group formulates ideologies and the other group does not, but instead that the ideologies of common people are generally not written down, circulated and recorded in archives to the same extent as the ideologies of elite people.

Secondly, instead of distinguishing between conscious practices or aspects of practices (ideology) and unconscious practices (mentality), the distinction is drawn between explicit ideas open to debate and the implicit frameworks of meaning within which such debates are meaningful. Such implicit frameworks of meaning are generally taken for granted and seldom liable to open discussion. They belong to the realm of the self-evident.

In my recent work I have looked for the key notions or cultural categories that are used to organize and legitimate social relationships. I have looked for the categories which are used to justify without themselves needing justification. One advantage of this operationalization is that it makes it possible not to make assumptions about total sharing: many people may use the same categories in roughly the same ways without necessarily investing them with exactly the same concrete meanings in social action.

With specific reference to Denmark, Thomas Højrup (1983a,b) has argued that the population can be divided into three main forms of life: the self-employed, the ordinary wage-worker and the educated career-oriented executive. The three forms of life are defined by mutual opposition and conflict. When people in different groups use words like work, family and home, they mean something entirely different. According to Højrup they share just the linguistic expressions, nothing more.

Contrary to Højrup I would argue that in spite of considerable differences, they do actually share more than mere words. First of all they share an assumption that such notions have some common meanings. Secondly they actually share the ability to use the notions rhetorically in order to make themselves understood, and this necessitates that they to some extent share the implicit frameworks of meanings within which such notions are embedded. Most Norwegians would for instance invest the cultural categories of “independence”, “wholeness”, “closeness” and “peace” with similar abstract meanings. In this way common cultural categories tie together and legitimate differences of social class and lifestyle. These categories are partially shared and partially not shared.

To specify the analytical task in this way involves making a distinction between, on the one hand, shared understandings in terms of sharing cultural categories defining human action and relationships, and, on the other hand, shared understandings in terms of joint or similar experiences, i.e. to distinguish between what defines and governs human thinking, communication and action and what constitutes the content of the thinking, communication and action. The one does not necessarily imply the other. People may share common overarching categories (“culture”) without having all the joint or similar experiences that result in a specific content being given to those categories (“subculture”, “partculture”, “local culture” or “form of life”). This way of operationalizing the definition of cultural categories solves the problem of cultural sharing and cultural diversity. Overarching cultural categories may be simultaneously shared and not shared. According to my interpretation of Norwegian culture, many Norwegians for instance want to have a nice home (et pent hjem), but exactly how a nice home is supposed to be equipped and furnished varies a great deal.

Motivated by these ideas, I have in recent years been working on identifying some of the central cultural categories in Norway, like equality as sameness, independence, self-control, love of nature, wholeness, closeness and a centering around the home (Gullestad 1984,
In Scandinavian contexts equality is often defined as sameness (likhet) and individuality as independence (Gullestad 1984, 1986a,b, 1991). The idea of equality defined as sameness is particularly important in that it explains why partcultural variations are often not explicitly registered, but leads all the same to subtle symbolic fences between people (Gullestad 1986a). It is, however, central to my approach that a culture should not be described by a list of categories, but by tracing the frameworks of meanings constituted by the relations among categories as well as among categories and social action. Contrary to Louis Dumont (1986) - from whom I have otherwise learnt a lot - I do not look for one ultimate value. Instead I see culture as complex networks of categories, meanings and practices. Notions like equality and individuality can in Western modernity be seen as metonyms for extensive networks of ideas, values and pragmatic practices. This conceptualization allows for some coherence as well as for gaps and discrepancies.

Peace and quiet

In order to illustrate this methodology, I will briefly summarize parts of an analysis of the cultural tensions in Norway between having peace and social involvement (Gullestad in press b). Peace and quiet as a cultural category is not only related to negative categories like tension, bother, noise, rush, anxiety, etc., but also to positive categories of excitement. "Life and movement" (liv og røre) is one such positive category which deals with activity and involvement. While peace and quiet connote the harmony of withdrawal, life and movement connote positive feelings of joy (liusglede) coming from active involvement with other people. With life and movement social boundaries are positively permeated. Norwegians want both peace and quiet and life and movement. However, peace and quiet is culturally more in the foreground than life and movement. Peace and quiet encompasses life and movement in the sense that peace and quiet is a prerequisite for being able to involve oneself in culturally correct ways. My young informants for instance often wanted a couple of beers in order to "find peace" (finne roen) before they went to experience the excitement of discotques.

It is important to note, that people may strongly disagree on what concrete activities are to be called peaceful or noisy. The analysis does not rest on the properties of persons as actors, but on what people can use on and for other people. In other words, it is not reference but interactional accomplishment through rhetorically powerful words which is the focus of this analytical perspective. Notions like peace and quiet are idioms, available for use as prominent items of the cultural vocabulary. These notions are, on the one hand, meaningless (meaning = reference) to the extent that each person or social group can invest them with particular experiences. On the other hand, these notions are also saturated with meaning (meaning = sense) to the extent that there is relatively little disagreement about them as cultural values. These meanings derive from their location within a larger cultural vocabulary.

Such notions are in my view not only overarching categories but also central categories in the sense that spelling out and analyzing their meaning bring one right into central aspects of Norwegian culture. If I start with one category, like in this case peace and quiet, I soon come across the other categories. In order to demonstrate that this is so, I have to refer the reader to my other works. Here I can only sketch a few transformations and interconnections: the ideas of independence and of wholeness (helhet) are connected to protection of social boundaries by a reduction of intensity of social relationships. Social interaction is easily interpreted as a reduction of autonomy and a fragmentation of the self. Therefore it becomes important to cut oneself off from social life to get peace and thereby to retain in a fundamental sense of control of the self. This control of the self is a prerequisite to be able to experience social involvement (society) in a culturally correct way, that is, in the way that means the least reduction of autonomy.

"To stay quiet" (å holde seg i ro) means as a rule to stay at home. The home-centeredness of
the culture is tied to a conceptual and practical separation between the home and the outside world, between private and public domains. To celebrate a life ritual in silence (i stillhet) means that only “the immediate family” (close kinship relations) will be present. To “keep the peace” (holde fred) often means to respect the boundaries around the family and the home. To keep the peace also means avoiding conflicts. One way to avoid conflicts in a personal relationship is to air difficulties only in the form of hints. Much of the communication is therefore implied and requires that each person knows the code.

Another way to avoid conflicts is to avoid the people and situations where these conflicts can arise. To keep the peace may in other words imply to avoid people one does not “fit in with” and confirms the notion of equality defined as sameness. This also ties in with Norwegian assumptions of social stability. Being quiet is similar to being stable. In addition a person who keeps the peace can manage, is self-reliant and does not saddle others with untimely outbursts. Peace and quiet can furthermore be connected with Norwegians’ love of nature. In nature and in the cottage there are many who find serenity (ro) and peace of mind (fred i sinnet).

These few glimpses of interconnections are meant to illustrate that there are strong indications that the different categories I have so far identified belong together, color each other and appear to form a pattern. This view does not, however, imply that I see Norwegian culture as a perfectly integrated system of symbols and meanings. A certain consistency and a certain cohesion are as already mentioned not opposed to looser forms of integration.

Continuity and change

To focus on overarching categories means to focus on relatively stable but not unchangeable cultural frameworks. But what about change? How do we determine what constitutes a significant change of forms of life? My position in relation to this question is parallel to my position in the discussion about differences and similarities: We can never understand change if we do not have a very good understanding of continuity. In all social change, also in revolutions, there is always something which does not change, and we have to be able to specify those continuities, in order to really be able to analyze the form and the direction of the changes. This fact is particularly important in periods with very rapid changes, like the present. If analyses are not anchored in the more continuous structures and processes, it is easily felt that the changes are more profound than they probably are. In some cases analyses anchored in this way demonstrate that relatively dramatic changes of ideologies and social practices may serve to reinforce notions and values on a more fundamental level.

The distinction between, on the one hand, overarching cultural categories and their implicit frameworks of meanings, and, on the other hand, part- or subcultural ways of life is a way of specifying the relationship between relative continuity and change. Overarching cultural categories belong to the slow-changing parts of culture. They are generally not contested, and are thus framing the ideological debates where differences of opinion are explicit and legitimate.

Even if they change more slowly, overarching categories do of course also change, and the question remains how to study changes of mentality. Such shifts are probably best understood historically, several hundred years after they happened. It may turn out to be impossible to spot them in the process, but I still think that it is well worth a try. By commuting back and forth between contextualized ethnographic details and interpretations of categories and their interrelations, it should be possible to discover considerable discrepancies of ideology for instance between people with different locations in the class structure and thereby to spot growing new tendencies within key groups. It should also be possible to spot differential applications according to context, as well as compartmentalizations, ambiguities and other inconsistencies that may carry a message of change.

Many people in Europe and the U.S. today argue that the changes that we now experience represent a very significant watershed.
They borrow a pair of concepts from architecture and aesthetics - modernism and postmodernism - and coin the transition as being one from modernity to postmodernity. My own view, speaking from the Norwegian experience, is that it is too early to say if we are witnessing such a fundamental change of mentality.

**Everyday life**

In a recent study of the transformations of the Norwegian notion of everyday life (Gullestad in press a) I have examined how everyday life has recently become an important political and commercial symbol in Scandinavia, replacing worn out symbols referring to the local community (lokalsamfunn, nærmiljø). The argument is based on the long-term field-work experiences among working-class families as well as on analyses of social planning and social science documents. "Everyday life" became a central notion in Norwegian society in the nineteen eighties. Formerly part of the temporal polarity of everyday vs. festival, the term everyday has slowly become part of the different polarity of everyday life vs. state bureaucracy. The new meanings of everyday life imply that society is seen crosswise, with each individual, the family and the home as the starting point. The fact that the old connotations (drudgery and plainness) to some extent live on with the new ones (closeness, wholeness, life), makes everyday life a rich and potent political symbol.

This change can be related to both the new self-centering of the nineteen eighties and the nineties as well as to the growing importance of the home in Scandinavia since the beginning of the last century. The idea of closeness (nærhet) is fundamentally a modern idea, but is anchored by Norwegians in the local communities of the past. Within contemporary Norwegian folk belief the modern idea of closeness is seen as a direct continuation of what is seen as the typical local relationships of the rural past.

Some scholars have seen the expansion of intimacy in Scandinavia as a result of bourgeois hegemony (e.g. Frykman and Löfgren 1987). In my view it should also be seen as a more fundamental attempt to recreate what is seen as the wholeness, independence, equality, integrity, and stability of primary commodity production in the leisure sphere of contemporary secularized society.

The new notion of everyday life may be seen as the latest in a long series of terms and ideas reaching at least as far back as the peasant customs that were idealized in the process of nation-building in the early nineteenth century. Norwegians try to recreate what they think they have lost (intimacy, closeness) in a new situation, and in this process they not only transform the qualities of their social relationships, but in a certain sense they also invent a new past.

As a continued invention of tradition, the notion of everyday life does not only point to the past, but also to the future. The most important discontinuity with the two former notions (lokalsamfunn and nærmiljø) is that locality is deemphasized, and this may be connected to the present stage of capitalism.

Since the new forms of closeness and intimacy were not a part of traditional peasant society, Norwegians have not lost intimacy, but to some extent, the dense local interconnections between people and activities of earlier times. In peasant and early industrial society family life, work, leisure and locality were tightly linked. The links have now been loosened by the extension of national and international communications to formerly isolated communities and, more recently by the introduction of information technology. This shift is connected to diversified consumption patterns and a new emphasis on creativity and self-expression in home-decoration and other activities. Life style has become more important as creation and expression of identity. In the same way as there are "style quotations" in architecture and painting there may be "style quotations" in folk cultural products like meals, home decoration and clothing.

These changes are dramatic and may, therefore, be the first indications of a long term shift of mentality. However, it can also be argued that while changing Norwegian culture still remains within the paradigm of secularized Western modernity. It all depends on which
process one considers the most crucial to socio-cultural modernity; differentiation, rationalization or individualization. On the one hand the new ideologies and patterns of life exhibit an emphasis on expressivity. The emphasis on expressivity represents an interesting counter-trend to the "rationalization" ostensibly characteristic of modernity. This shift may actually indicate a more fundamental change of mentality. On the other hand, new forms of differentiation and individualization are also in evidence: the split between the local community and the home can be seen as a new stage in the process of socio-cultural differentiation, and the new emphasis on life style as self-expression can be analyzed as a new stage in the process of individualization. If individualism and differentiation are regarded as the most important aspects of modernity, the new cultural practices can thus be analyzed as just one more transformation of the Scandinavian version of modernity.

Closing note

Anthropologists and ethnologists do participant observations in defined physical locations, institutions or social networks. Our material is fundamentally colored by the subcultures or partcultures where we do our interviews and observations. Interpretations of the implicit meanings of overarching cultural categories have to be grounded in observations among particular people in particular places. The step between evidence (taken from one or more subcultural way of life) to encompassing interpretations is greater than usual, if the usual is taken to be the portrayal of one partcultural or subcultural form of life.

I do not see this as a question of "generalization" of qualitative analysis. Such a phrasing of the problem very quickly leads to questions of sampling and boundaries which make anthropologists and European ethnologists look like bad survey sociologists. I would rather like to rephrase the problem as one of "range", "extent", "era and area of relative power" of our interpretations. Cultures do seldom have clear-cut boundaries, and I see no point in being too precise. Instead I would argue that we sometimes have to dare to stretch our observations to produce attempts at synthesis, knowing fully well that these are always human constructions and never simple discoveries of reality. We need images of social and cultural wholes in order to locate our observations and analyses of the parts. Synthesizing interpretations have to be based on extensive evidence, but they cannot be completely documented. However, such attempts at synthesis have continuously to be checked with further observations and interpretations.

There is thus no other way to proceed in interpretive analysis than to establish a comparative framework for the examination of cultural processes through comparison and the systematic study of variation. This means continuously to move back and forth between practices and abstractions, between contextualized details and the implicit frameworks of meanings of overarching categories, between partcultures and culture, between case studies and ideas about what the cases are cases of.

Most anthropologists and European ethnologists who work in contemporary complex societies have until recently seldom asked what culture or civilization each local community or partculture is a part of. Such questions are often left to the disciplines of philosophy and the history of ideas. Because the history of ideas bases itself upon written ideologies of the elite rather than upon the implicit understandings of all groups (including the elite), a bias exists which it is worth contributing to correct.

Notes

1. The word subculture is here defined as a form of life in opposition to the dominant culture. In contrast to this, partculture is defined as a form of life not characterized by opposition or open resistance.
2. Compared to traditional versions of Marxism, my projects have been very different. I have, so to speak, started in the other end. Class analysts start by analyzing class structure and I have started by analyzing economic, social and cultural differences, as they emerge in the daily life of my informants (see Gullestad 1984, p. 24-27). I have, however, always used economic class analysis as a
way of anchoring the ethnographic material, but I have never taken the care really to spell out in detail how ethnographic studies of partcultures simultaneously provide extenstions as well as corrections of class analysis. In the recent literature there are, however, several very different but stimulating attempts of doing exactly that. By combining among other things Marxism and semiology, researchers from the Birmingham school of cultural studies in England have shown how the local level resistance of young people may serve to reproduce their position in the larger class based society (see for instance Willis 1977). In Denmark Thomas Højrup (1983a,b) has introduced a structural life mode analysis inspired by structural Marxism. The advantage of this mode of analysis is that the structural interrelations between forms of life are systematically clarified. Its drawback is that it lacks a notion of human agency and a sophisticated theory of culture. In Sweden a project in Lund on class culture and culture building has developed the notion of cultural hegemony to study how class cultures are historically interreleated (see Frykman and Löfgren 1987). I see these different attempts as valuable elaborations of the necessary elements which are needed to get a more complete understanding of how forms of life are interrelated. The Danish life-mode analysis and the Swedish project about class cultures and culture building are more extensively reviewed in Gullestad 1989b.

3. A life style may be defined as the expressive or communicative aspects of a form of life. Certain elements in the total form of life are selected and given special symbolic value as expressions of identity (Gullestad 1989c).

4. My intention is to extend, elaborate, and substantiate these ideas through new data collection. My present research project about notions of childhood in Norway is based on the analysis of written autobiographies (Gullestad 1988c). The idea is to commute back and forth between contextualized ethnographic detail and more comprehensive interpretations, in order to be able to identify cultural categories and their interrelations.

Literature


