Over the last couple of years the world has come to know the name of a small country church outside Portadown, in Northern Ireland. The name ‘Drumcree’ now epitomises a whole complex of political and social tensions surrounding, primarily, different perceptions of nationality, identity, and citizenship in that part of the world. Every July, the local Orange Order stages a parade to and from Drumcree parish church (Figure 1) as part of the so-called ‘marching season’. The high point of this ‘season’ is on July 12, when marchers commemorate the victory of King William of Orange over the deposed King James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. Unionist protagonists see in these parades a celebration of Northern Irish Protestant culture and history, and a popular affirmation of the constitutional union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. To their Nationalist opponents, the parades are triumphalist displays reflecting the supremacist attitude of the Unionists.

Chronology of a Dispute

The issue of Orange parades has long been a source of controversy in Northern Ireland. In the late 1990s, despite the cease-fires by paramilitary groups, open conflict and rioting in connection with parades has escalated. Some observers have suggested that the parades issue has replaced paramilitary violence as a focal point for political confrontation.

On July 9, 1995, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) prevented an Orange Order parade from marching along the Garvaghy Road on its return from an annual service at Drumcree parish church. A two-day stand-off ensued as the Orangemen refused to disperse or be re-routed. On July 10, attempts were made to break through the RUC barricades, and sporadic rioting broke out at Drumcree and several other areas throughout Northern Ireland. Thousands of parade supporters converged on Portadown as Orange Order leaders and senior police officers tried to negotiate a solution to the crisis. In the evening, a rally at the church was addressed by the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, the Rev. Ian Paisley, MP, who later, together with Ulster Unionist politician David Trimble, MP, made an unsuccessful attempt to break through the RUC cordon. On the morning of July 11, a compromise was reached with the help of an independent mediation group, and the parade was allowed to proceed along the Garvaghy Road, provided they did so silently. Led by MPs David Trimble and Ian Paisley,
some five hundred Orangemen eventually marched down the road. Although the parade passed off peacefully, when it reached the centre of town, the two politicians raised their arms in an apparently triumphant gesture, an action that caused severe resentment among the Garvaghy Road residents.

In the light of events in 1995, the RUC Chief Constable decided on July 6, 1996, to re-route the parade, in accordance with Article 4 of the 1987 Public Order (NI). This allows for restrictions on the route of a parade if the Chief Constable considers it a potential cause of public disorder. The Chief Constable may also, with
the consent of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, request the district council concerned to issue a prohibition order, banning all parades in a particular area. On July 7, 1996, the RUC once again prevented the Orange parade from Drumcree along the Garvagh Road. In the afternoon, the Grand Master of the Orange Order, the Rev. Martin Smyth, declared that this time there could be no compromise. By midnight, more than four thousand protesters had gathered at Drumcree. A four-day stand-off commenced, accompanied by disruption and rioting in many locations throughout Northern Ireland. The crowd assembled at Drumcree continued to grow, and there were increasing outbreaks of violence throughout the region. During the confrontation at the barbed wire barricades erected by the RUC and the British Army at Drumcree, three demonstrators were injured by plastic bullets. Given the scale and spread of the disorder, the resources of the RUC were stretched to their limit, and additional British Army contingents were sent to Northern Ireland for support. Serious conflict erupted in Belfast, following a number of Orange parades, with several Catholic families being intimidated out of their homes. During the unrest, one person was killed and well over one hundred people were injured. By the evening of July 10, some ten thousand demonstrators had arrived at Drumcree. On the following morning, the Chief Constable gave in to this pressure and allowed the parade to go ahead. Some twelve hundred Orangemen marched along the Catholic Garvagh Road. Local residents had not been consulted, and rioting broke out, spreading quickly to nationalist areas elsewhere. Many people were injured, some seriously, and one man who was run over by an armoured vehicle later died. Severe rioting in nationalist areas continued for several days. The Chief Constable’s decision to let the parade go ahead was criticised by local community groups, politicians, Church leaders, and the Irish Government. He defended his decision in a BBC radio interview, arguing that with an anticipated crowd of more than sixty thousand Orange supporters assembling at Drumcree on the eve of July 12, he would not have been able to enforce the ban.

As a result of the events in 1996, many Nationalists in Northern Ireland lost faith in the RUC as an impartial police force. The leader of the Nationalist Sinn Féin party, Gerry Adams, MP, said that members of the Nationalist community apparently had no rights. In a public statement on July 12, he declared the RUC as completely unacceptable to this community, and called for radical changes to its organisation. John Hume, MP, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and his deputy Seamus Mallon, MP, strongly condemned the Government’s response to the situation. The Irish Government expressed its concern at the situation, and surprise that dialogue had not continued between the different groups involved. The Taoiseach (Prime Minister), John Bruton, TD, when interviewed on television for BBC One’s main evening news, severely criticised the British Government for yielding to pressure from the Orange Order. Moreover, in a statement on July 25, he condemned the British Government for yielding to force, being inconsistent in its policy decisions and partial in its application of the law, thereby failing on key principles of democracy.

As in the previous two years, the parade on July 6, 1997 initiated widespread unrest across Northern Ireland. No agreement had been reached between the local Orange Order and the Garvagh Road residents. In this situation, it fell to the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, MP, to decide whether the parade should be allowed to proceed. During the period leading up to the event, the British Army presence in Northern Ireland was reinforced. RUC and British Army checkpoints were set up in the Portadown area. Women from the Garvagh Road district formed a peace camp in tents pitched by the side of the road. A paramilitary organisation, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), threatened to kill Catholics if the parade was prevented from proceeding along the Garvagh Road. The Orange Order rejected a proposal to waive its right to march as a gesture of reconciliation. In view of the considerable RUC and Army presence in the area, it was widely believed that the parade would be banned. However, at half past three in the morning of July 6, soldiers and police officers
sealed off the Catholic housing estates along the Garvaghy Road. Residents were prevented from attending Mass at the local Catholic church. Instead, Mass was celebrated in the open, in front of the police and army lines. At lunchtime, the parade was allowed along the Garvaghy Road. Once it had passed and the security forces began to withdraw, rioting erupted once more, spreading rapidly to other parts of Northern Ireland.

In the aftermath of these events, a Parades Commission was established, and given responsibility for decisions on contentious parades. On June 29, 1998, this Commission announced that the parade to and from Drumcree, planned for July 5, was to be re-routed. The Orange Order, in response, announced that it would march its ‘traditional’ route and, if prevented from doing so, would stay on the spot until allowed to proceed, however long this might take. As in the previous year, the security forces in the area were increased in preparation for the anticipated confrontation. Soldiers erected a barricade on the road between Drumcree parish church and the Garvaghy Road. A trench lined with barbed wire was dug through the fields on either side. After their annual service at Drumcree on July 5, the Orange Order first marched up to this barricade, but then returned to the church where it set up an encampment. Another stand-off had begun. The Orange Order announced that its members would remain encamped at Drumcree until they are allowed to march back to the town along their ‘traditional’ route. The Grand Master and other leading figures joined the protest during the day, and during the following night there was widespread rioting in Protestant areas across Northern Ireland. During the period July 4–14, 1998, the RUC recorded a total of 2,561 public order incidents. More than three hundred buildings were damaged. In over six hundred attacks on members of the security forces, seventy-six police officers were injured. Most of the private houses that were damaged were owned or occupied by Catholics, and many families were forced from their homes. A number of Catholic schools were vandalised and set on fire. It was generally expected that the crisis would intensify over the weekend of July 12, the high point of the ‘marching season’. In the early hours of Sunday, July 12, 1998, three Catholic boys were burnt to death in an arson attack on their home. Although this tragedy provoked condemnation from right across the political spectrum, and the escalation of the crisis was stalled somewhat, the local Orange Order in Portadown voted unanimously to continue their stand-off, and a token presence at Drumcree has been maintained by Orange supporters since then.

**Territory and Identity**

Parades and processions going from A to B, and returning by a different route are a common, perfectly normal and widely accepted human practice. The annual procession to and from Drumcree parish church, however, gives rise to major grievances on both sides, because the return path leads the processing group through the territory of another group, who object to this happening. Both groups claim their civil rights and liberties, qualities of their citizenship, to defend their respective point of view. A main cause of the conflict lies in differential assertions of nationality. And yet both sides are united in a common identity not merely by virtue of their residence in Northern Ireland, but through the vital role that this antagonism itself plays for their ethnic self-ascription, which forms the centre and focus of their identity. Anyone watching the news during late June and early July will know that the two sides are reluctant to engage in verbal dialogue. What reporters (and many politicians) fail to understand is that the situation itself constitutes a dialogue, like a more or less silent game of chess, enacted in the streets. The dialogue is about territory, and about ownership thereof. By marching along the Garvaghy Road, Ulster Unionists claim this area as theirs. By opposing their march, Irish Nationalists deny that claim.

Postmodern utopias notwithstanding, the challenge of territory still lies at the root not just of ethnic conflict, but of ethnicity itself, which can be understood as "a product of disassociation between territory and culture" (Oomen 1994: 191). Following Orvar Löfgren (1996: 165), "[w]e need to reflect upon what kinds of contributions European ethnologists can make
to the heated interdisciplinary debate on identities and territories. What could, or should be the most obvious concerns of European ethnologists "in relation to the Europe we see today, and in relation to what those disciplines closest to us study" (Christiansen 1996: 137)? Anthropologists and European ethnologists can offer their knowledge of 'culture', and their ethnographic expertise (Thompson 1997: 786). They can challenge the narrow instrumentalist notion of culture, apparent in European and national policy documents, whereby "cultural diversity seems to be fading into nothing else than the diversity of fauna and flora" (Krasnodebski 1994: 50f.).

The relationship between nations, states and ethnicities can be reflected both at a theoretical, and an empirical level. Northern Ireland, with its colourful mix of identities, is a prime example of how "[h]ybridisation and the implementation of identities ... draw attention to the crisis of the nation state and ... challenge its homogenising logic" (cf. Caglar 1997: 177). Also, "[t]ransnational migrants bring into question the state’s ability to define 'the people'" (Jacobson 1996: 4), and, ironically, "nationals of member states who exercise their right to work and live in another member state thereby disenfranchise themselves" (Brewing 1997: 235). Territory still matters, and plays a decisive role in determining belonging, both in a cultural, and in a legal sense. Moreover, "cultural boundaries ... may not be coterminous with identities at a variety of hierarchical levels," and we need to take into account "the possibility that the boundaries of cultural meanings and the historical flow of events and concrete social interactions which give rise to them are not accurately definable by reference to fixed time, space and population co-ordinates" (Handwerker 1997: 806).

In this context, the debate on multiculturalism "highlights the tension between equality and difference", the need to reconcile "the right to be different with the right to be equal", and to define any limits to such rights (Caglar 1997: 178).

Historical and contemporary attempts to construct 'Europe' as a unity have been characterised as "highly partial histories, as well as being extremely narrative" (Christiansen 1996: 139). Such constructions are employed to justify inclusion and exclusion. Interestingly, it appears that for the European Union (EU), inclusion is determined on economic, exclusion on cultural grounds (Kockel 1998). All this raises some serious questions with regard to European integration, and to which European ethnology may be able to offer, if not answers, at least valuable insights.

Nationality, Citizenship and Identity

For the purpose of these reflections, the three key terms – nationality, citizenship, and identity – need to be clearly differentiated. Nationality is understood here as attachment to a specific community imagined as ‘natural’, and defined in terms of a cultural, historically rooted nation. Citizenship, by contrast, denotes attachment to a specific polity constructed as a state in terms of rights and obligations. Identity is seen, on the one hand, as the totality of relationships defining an individual vis-à-vis other individuals, engendering a sense of belonging (or alienation). On the other hand, it signifies a set of markers shared by a particular group, indicating its members’ attachment to a nation (nationality) or state (citizenship). The relationship between these three categories can
be represented in different ways, reflecting different actualisations or aspirations.

Figure 2 represents what seems to be the aspiration of the EU as expressed in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Nationality forms an essential part of identity, but is also an integral part of citizenship – like Scots or Welsh nationality, which are assumed to be fully contained within British citizenship. It also acknowledges that an individual’s identity is larger than her/his citizenship, and suggests that citizenship, like nationality, is an essential part of a person’s identity.

Figure 3 gives a more realistic representation of the three categories in relation to each other. Most non-migrant people would probably see parts of their nationality and citizenship as irrelevant to, and even outside of their individual identity, and for many of them, citizenship and nationality, although connected (and connected also within their identity), would not be necessarily congruent.

The integrated migrant population, especially in the second and later generations, is more accurately represented by Figure 4. Born in one territory, or at least descending from parents born there, but now citizens of another territory, this group represents the classic case of hyphenated identities, such as ‘Irish-American’, where ‘Irish’ is the nationality, ‘American’ the citizenship, and identity provides quasi the hyphen.

Finally, in Figure 5 we see the alienated person. In this extreme form, few cases may fit the representation, but the graphic serves to highlight the ‘end product’ of the process of disenfranchisement that not just the immigrant, but especially the EU internal migrant, and even the non-migrant population might suffer in certain political and cultural circumstances. The proposal of an EU citizenship may perhaps be seen as an attempt to prevent such a situation. But is it suitable for the purpose?

The EU and the Idea of Cultural Citizenship

In the Maastricht Treaty, the EU committed itself to promoting the cultures of the Member States while simultaneously respecting internal diversity and enhancing a common heritage. The thinking behind this project is evidently the same that informed the creation of especially the larger Member States, constituting them as ‘nation-states’ of encompassing – British, French, German – ‘state-nations’ that had to be constructed in the process. These nation-states, presumably integrating cultural diversity across a substantial territory into ‘one
nation', obviously served as a model for Article 128, which states that "The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and ... bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore."

But how does the EU understand culture, and cultural diversity? Let us look at the Commission’s 1987 document (EC Bulletin Supplement 4/87: 10), *A Fresh Boost for Culture*:

"The completion of the internal market implies -- at the cultural level -- the realisation of four major objectives ...:
(i) the free movement of cultural goods and services;
(ii) better living and working conditions for those involved in cultural activities;
(iii) the creation of new jobs in the cultural sector in association with regional development ...;
(iv) the emergence of a cultural industry which is competitive within the Community and in the world at large."

Culture consists, therefore, of goods and services, provided by a class of culture professionals, and administered by culture managers. It constitutes a sector of the economy and, as such, an industry where competition is a key goal ensuring smooth functioning of the market and, ultimately, customer satisfaction. Culture is, therefore, an economic activity like farming, manufacturing, or banking. An anthropologist might argue, however, that all of these are culturally contingent forms of socio-economic organisation, or institutions. Anthropologically, 'culture' refers to the ways in which things are done differently in different parts of the world, or by different groups -- like Ulster Unionists and Irish Nationalists in Northern Ireland -- in the same part. Therefore, culture is a process in which everyone is involved, not a product created by a few. This latter concept of culture has its historical roots in the role cultural intellectuals have played in the ideological construction of those 'national' traditions and identities that Article 128 calls 'the cultures of the Member States' -- in other words, where culture has been an instrument of power politics and internal colonialism.

The Treaty of Amsterdam says little about culture. A key word search of the Internet version only produced 'agriculture'. It speaks instead of citizenship, and also of -- once again national -- identities. The essential statements are contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty. According to Article 1(5), a key objective of the EU is "to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union." Article 1(8) states that the EU shall "respect the national identities of its Member States." Citizenship of the EU is formally established in Article 2(9), which decrees that "[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union." This citizenship shall, however, not replace national citizenship. Significantly, following this Treaty, citizens of the EU may now, according to Article 2(11), write to any EU institution in one of the Treaty languages and "have an answer in the same language".

Citizenship has two principal functions. It
determines who does or does not belong to 'the people' constituting a particular state. Moreover, the rules of citizenship determine the character of interactions between the individual and the state, "the rights and obligations of the citizen, the kind of access the citizen has to the state, and the kinds of demands the state can make upon the citizen" (Jacobson 1996: 7). Thus, "citizenship is the linchpin of the nation-state" (loc.cit.). This traditional basis of the nation-state is continuously eroded by transnational migration (op.cit.: 8) and "[t]he devaluation of citizenship, together with the weakening of sovereign control and the principle of national self-determination, creates questions about the legitimacy of these states" (op.cit.: 9).

The legitimacy debate has been with us since the 1960s, and for many different reasons which cannot be discussed here. Establishment of a citizenship of the European Union may be not so much the emancipatory gesture as which the Treaty of Amsterdam seems to present it, but rather the necessary complement of a strategy that aims to increase mobility while at the same time effectively diminishing the sovereign powers of nation-states. If the depreciation of citizenship at that level is not balanced somehow, the danger is that we ultimately end up with an alienated population as indicated in Figure 5 earlier. Alienation breeds social discontent, signified by a lack of loyalty towards the state and its institutions, whose legitimacy is called into question. It may also be worth observing the terminology of the treaty: "Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union". Consequently, British citizenship, for example, comprising many indigenous and exogenous nationalities, now becomes itself, at the stroke of a pen, a nationality. The terminological ambiguity of everyday language is here used to powerful political effect.

Belonging in and to 'Europe'

Thompson distinguishes "three categories of ethnic minorities defined in terms of their historical relationship to a dominant or majority group" (1997: 791). Indigenous peoples form "relic cultures" in former colonies like the USA or Australia. Nationalities have a potential claim to statehood, like the Scots or the Basques. Under the ambiguous label of cultural minorities, Thompson includes groups seeking protection of specific cultural practices and/or beliefs, but not necessarily statehood, such as transnational migrants. Growing awareness of the differentiated nature of cultural diversity — which is indeed much more complex than the competition of cultural producers, recognised by the EU — has sparked off the debate on multiculturalism with its focus on the conflicting rights of difference and equality. This debate takes different forms and directions in different political cultures, as can be illustrated with reference to three major nation-states in the EU: France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

The concept of 'freedom' is, for example, interpreted quite differently in each of the three cultures (Schiffauer 1997). While in France, the essence of freedom is equality, in the United Kingdom it is the integrity of the individual. Both cultures converge, however, in the way they actualise these concepts through a set of agreed rules that allow an orderly societal competition to achieve the common good through negotiation. In Germany, freedom is inextricably linked to the concept of responsibility. This presumes metaphysical knowledge of the common good to which equality and individual integrity may have to be, if not sacrificed, at least subordinated. Thus a dialectical relationship between individual and society is posited which may be described as holistic, in contrast to the more particularistic relationships characterising British and French political culture. Germany and France are often compared as examples of contrasting concepts of nationhood (for example: Smith 1988; Jacobson 1996) — an ethnic nation the former, a civic nation the latter. It seems to me that similarly conflicting ideas of nationality are behind the tensions we witness in Drumcree and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, where the essentially ethnic Irish nation confronts an essentially civic British nation in by now customary stand-off or open rioting.

Ethnic resurgence, like inter-state migration, threatens the nation-state (Kockel 1990), whose elites tend to see genuine ethnic pluralism as hampering their efforts to promote de-
mocracy, and therefore essentially anti-democratic. We have all, over the last few years, heard phrases like ‘nationalism raises its ugly head again’. With reference to Asia, but equally applicable to Europe, Brown (1994) has identified three types of this argument. ‘Ethnic chaos’ theories serve to justify restrictive policies on the grounds that democracy and national unity need to be safeguarded. A second type is the postulate of a consensual volonté general, embodied by the state, which would be undermined by the recognition of ethnic diversity. Thirdly, the majority principle legitimises the dominance of a cultural majority. These types are not mutually exclusive and appear together in many currently popular political arguments urging us ‘Europeans’ to cultivate the virtues of civic over and above ethnic nationalism. Anthropologists are understandably reserved in their support for such arguments. While acknowledging the commonsensical and humanitarian aspects of civic nationalism, they are all too aware that this same ideology has served to bring ethnically diverse peripheries under the control of culturally different centres of power, using the disguise of a common/communal ideology to ‘buy off’, in the first place, the local elites. In this sense, civic nationalism may be the nationalism of the imperialist whereas ethnic nationalism may be the nationalism of the colonised. German nationalism gathered strength particularly during the Napoleonic wars, and again after the Treaty of Versailles – both periods experienced as periods of colonisation by, first and foremost, a Civic nation. That this ethnic nationalism turned itself imperialistic as the power of the state increased does not invalidate the basic distinction.

The EU has committed itself, in the Maasstricht Treaty and, less clearly, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, to protecting regional diversity. In doing so, diversity has obviously been perceived as being of the ‘cultural minorities’ kind that poses no challenge to either the Union, or its individual member states. Nationality has been attributed to these member states, and ‘nationalities’ without a state have thereby been reduced, politically and legally, to ‘cultural minorities’. If their claims for the protection and promotion of specific cultural beliefs and practices are met, their ‘entitlements’ can be regarded as fulfilled, and the pursuit of any aspirations to statehood becomes illegitimate, if not illegal. One might argue, as some nationalists in the EU do, that concessions on, for example, language maintenance are merely granted to keep movements for self-determination at bay. This may be an extreme view, but the experience of multi-ethnic states, from the USA to the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, suggests that the more ethnic identities are protected, the weaker identification with the larger whole becomes. Unless ethnic diversity in itself becomes an integral part of identity for all members of the state society, the ‘melting-pot’ ideology leads to a zero-sum game. Until Irish nationalists in Portadown join the Orange procession parading along the Garvaghy Road – and are genuinely welcomed to do so – we have a problem. But once they would join, the event would lose its meaning and purpose. So, once again, identity in society appears as a zero sum game – if Irish nationalists culturally appropriated Orange marches, Ulster unionists would no longer own them in an exclusive way. Whether they would, consequently, disown them as henceforth meaningless or grasp the nettle of multiculturalism is quite another question.

The Amsterdam Treaty, as other European documents before it, postulates hierarchical levels of belonging in the EU: the nation-state, and the Union. It seems that any level below the state, or, as it were, between state and union, is not considered important, merely providing additional colour to the two key levels. Yet these excluded, or at best ignored sources of cultural plurality are, in fact, where people’s primary identities tend to be located: as migrants, as inhabitants of cultural regions, or as members of nationalities, religions, or social movements. Migrant identity, nationality and citizenship, to take only one example, are problematic not only for immigrants, but also for internal migrants. As a German national living in Britain and teaching Irish culture I have a complex enough identity; having been out of German territory for more than ten years, I find myself politically disenfranchised. At present, while I may pay tax and discharge other civic duties, I do not have a vote in national elections in my
country of residence. By exercising my right to free mobility within the EU, I have deprived myself of meaningful political franchise. Not a full citizen of anywhere, I doubt very much that European citizenship will make a significant difference in the short term – and suspect that many migrants will join me in this. In Europe we do not, technically, belong anywhere (whatever I might imagine in my private mind); so do we belong to Europe, at least?

The sociologist Max Haller (1994) has identified a set of prerequisites for a European identity, modelled on the ‘national’ identities of the nation-state. These prerequisites include a territorial basis, established through history of residence and consistency of area; an integrated economy built on interdependence and free mobility; and, a common culture of shared elements, such as language and religion. In part, his criteria are certainly fulfilled, although they remain problematic even so. If history of residence in the territory of Europe is a criterion, then immigrants are, by definition, excluded. That this is handled differently in the US might give us pause for thought. Consistency of area may be a suitable criterion for nation-states, but a European identity is difficult to perceive on this basis, since nobody really knows where ‘Europe’ begins and ends, as the current multi-disciplinary debate on the matter demonstrates. We do indeed live in an interdependent, integrated economy, but free mobility within it is available only at a price even (as my own experience shows) for socially more privileged migrants, and therefore not genuinely ‘free’. Common culture is the most differentiated of Haller’s criteria, and he gives language and religion as key examples, although the territorial definition of a consistent area also implies more material cultural markers. With regard to language, English is indeed making great inroads and may well become the language of the EU. But is this the native tongue spoken by a minority of Europeans populating some offshore island in the north-western corner of the EU, or is it rather the language of the global cultural hegemony at the end of the twentieth century, the USA? And does that make any difference? With regard to religion, should this criterion be used merely to exclude Europe’s definitive ‘Other’, Islam, from our common culture, thereby denying the great cultural contribution of Islam to the formation of what might pass for a ‘European’ culture (if there is such a thing)? Or should it be applied to deny basic civil rights to either Protestants or Catholics in Portadown? Haller sees these problems, and acknowledges that a European identity cannot be formed in analogy to the national identities that have been constructed over the last few centuries. But what, if anything, can it be based on?

Drumcree and European Identity

Oomen (1994: 189f.) points out that the fusion of citizenship and nationality was a goal of the nation-state, which sought to accommodate different nationalities within a common citizenship. Where nationalities are strongly developed as in the United Kingdom, this attempted fusion may create centrifugal forces. Common citizenship is necessary to facilitate such goals as the free mobility of labour, but the strengthening of multiple nationalities is essential to provide a "basic anchorage for cultural diversity" if such is genuinely seen as an asset. The Free State of Bavaria, or the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, represent and safeguard the nationalities of their nationals who are, at the same time, fully Bavarian and fully German, fully Catalan and fully Spanish. They can be both, because being Bavarian or Catalan is different from being German or Spanish. Why this should be so is a question that lawyers or economists would probably find difficult to answer. Sociologists, political scientists or psychologists might fare somewhat better, geographers possibly better still. By virtue of their subject, but also the history of their discipline, European ethnologist should have something more to say on this question. In these allegedly postmodern times, we hear much about the deterritorialisation of identities through increasing interdependence, globalisation and migration as well as the much-discussed 'end of the nation-state'. But, as Orvar Löfgren, whom I quoted earlier, has pointed out, instead of "fac ing a future of intense deterritorialization", we may simply be failing to observe "the different ways in which people and identities take place.
on new arenas and in novel forms” (Löfgren 1996: 166). If that is indeed so, then European ethnologists, specialists in what makes people different as well as in what makes them equal, may have much to contribute not just to the debate, but to the practical working out of citizenship, nationality and identity.

Observers of Northern Ireland often represent what is happening there as a relic from a dark European past. This perspective may be rather misdirected (Kockel 1994). What we are witnessing in Northern Ireland is the slow, painful negotiation of nationality, citizenship and identity in their territorial context as part of a deliberate political process involving an entire regional society at the level of everyday experience. The success or failure of this process will have significant implications well beyond the territorial limits of this particular conflict (Kockel 1999). As a European ethnologist, I am observing Drumree, and all that it symbolises, as a possible window into the future of more than Northern Ireland — perhaps ‘Europe’, whatever that may be.

Notes
1. An earlier version of this essay was presented at a Jean Monnet Conference held by the Centre for European and International Law at the University of Liverpool on July 4th, 1998. I am particularly grateful for comments from Gerard Delanty and Nanette Neuwahl.
2. At the time of writing, I was a lecturer at the Institute of Irish Studies, University of Liverpool.

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