The Nation and its Shadow

Imagining Subversion in Post-‘911’ Pakistan and Holland

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The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington have led to renewed public debates on national identity in various countries. This contribution focuses on two of them: Pakistan and the Netherlands. Starting from the assumption that the nation is a project of liberation from a pre-nation past, it is argued that these debates necessarily imply an increased reflection on the nature of this pre-nation past, which is called the nation’s shadow. In Pakistan, the nation is imagined as an Islamic liberation from feudalism, kinship solidarity, and ethnic loyalties. In Holland, the nation is imagined as secular and opposed to a Dutch history of pillarization in which religious authorities acted as intermediaries between the citizen and the state. What are considered the loyalties and sentiments of the past are allowed in private. However, they also inform the imagination of a subversive domain that encroaches upon the nation. Hence, subversion politics in Pakistan is imagined as a form of illicit kinship politics, whereas in Holland subversion is linked to religious – primarily Islamic – mentalities.

If, as Richard Rubinstein (1987) suggests, the logic of modern-day terrorism lies in creating chaos and revealing the ‘true face of naked power’ lurking beneath state authority by provoking the state to take outrageously violent measures in retaliation for a spectacular attack on persons or buildings symbolizing the state, then Gavrilo Princip’s killing of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo in June 1914 is still by far the most successful terrorist attack in history. The assassination was taken as an act of war by the Austrians and their handling of this attack eventually led to the First World War, which not only set Europe on fire, but also destroyed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, leading to the establishment of new nation states in Southeast Europe. It was an unprecedented success for a small group of Serbian nationalists known as the Narodna Odbrana, who would not have stood a chance, had they tried to reach their goals in some other way.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 have as yet not been so successful. Their impact has nonetheless been remarkable, primarily of course in the US, where the new Patriot Act has affected the life of US citizens of Muslim, Arab or South Asian background (e.g. Feldman 2002; Mohammad-Arif 2002), and also for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was held responsible for the attacks. But also in countries not directly related to the conflict, ‘911’ has had considerable consequences. In this chapter, I want to focus on two such countries: Pakistan and the Netherlands. In both countries, domestic political affairs have been drastically affected by the attacks of 11 September. In Pakistan, the position of the military regime of General Parveez Musharraf has become much stronger. Isolated both domestically and internationally prior to ‘911’, the military regime has become a major ally of the US since then, with the result that the undemocratic status of the regime is no longer questioned internationally. In that sense, Pakistan is back to where it was in the 1960s and 1980s, when the authority of the military...
regimes led by General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul Haq respectively relied heavily on US support. Since the renewed importance of Pakistan for the US, General Musharraf has tried to present Pakistan to the world as a modern and liberal Muslim state, a far cry from supposedly aggressive or ‘fundamentalist’ Islamic states such as Taliban Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Sudan. As a result of this, ‘911’ has led to an increased debate on the nature or essence of the Pakistani nation.

The relation between the Netherlands and the ‘911’ attacks is less clear. Apart from the fact that Osama bin Laden in a video broadcast by Al Jazeera claimed that many copies of the Qur’an had been sold in Holland after the Al Qaeda attacks on the US, Holland was in no way directly involved. Nonetheless, in an almost unprecedented way the question of national identity has become a matter of fierce debate in Holland, too. In the first weeks or months after the attacks, the most popular explanation in the press and media was a culturalist or civilizationalist argument, which looked for reasons and motives in Islam, subsequently contrasted with modernity or Western civil- ization. Before long the public debate focused on the integration and assimilation of recent Muslim migrants in Dutch society, as Muslims were at best believed to live between two – supposedly incongruous – cultures. It was the up-and-coming populist political leader Pim Fortuyn, who used the prevalent anti-Islam sentiments in his campaign for the national elections in May 2002 in a way that many people felt was unthinkable prior to the Al Qaeda attacks of 2001. Fortuyn’s campaign dramatically came to an end when he was shot dead nine days before the national elections.

What I want to argue here is that both in Pakistan and in the Netherlands, ‘911’ not only led to increased reflection on the nation, but also on what I would like to call the nation’s shadow. That is not the same as the nation’s ‘Other’, although the nation’s shadow may be projected onto the nation’s ‘Other’. More often the nation’s shadow is projected onto the past. I take the nation as a project of liberation from a pre-nation past. In the case of Holland, for instance, the nation portrays itself as liberated from the clutches of community-based religion. Holland prides itself on being a rational, tolerant, and above all secular country. In Pakistan, the nation is often conceived as a liberation of kinship, tribal, ethnic, or otherwise ‘particularistic’ loyalties. Pakistan likes to see itself as a Muslim society true to the universal message of Islam. In the ideal situation – when the project of liberation has successfully come to an end, so to speak – the past has become a private matter. When restricted to the private sphere, religion in Holland and family or ethnic ties in Pakistan do not threaten the unity of the nation.

That, however, is a utopia, since the nation constantly defines itself in relation to the past it is about to free itself from. As Talal Asad (1999) has argued in a critique of secularism, religion is a lot more than a private conviction even in a secular society. It is rather the significant other by which the secular defines itself, and in that sense it is essentially public. A similar argument can be made for Pakistan, where the importance of Islam in the national project cannot be understood without taking into account how Islam has often been defined in opposition to ethnic or kinship (biradari) loyalties. The nation and its shadow – the past out of which the nation has sprung and from which it has freed itself – go together, just like in Freud’s words modern civilization evokes its own discontents, or in Edward Said’s words, the West only knows itself in relation to its imagined antithesis known as the Orient.

To some extent I use the term shadow the way it was used by Carl Gustav Jung. As Jung proposed, we can suppress whatever we do not like, but that does not mean it will go away. It finds refuge in our shadow, where it sticks with us and grows like mould in dark places. It continues to influence our behavior, but since we do not face and recognize it, we cannot effectively deal with it. Similarly, certain loyalties and identities are suppressed in the national project. They are at best tolerated within the private. But that does not mean they become unimportant. Rather, they are believed to be the forces that secretly and invisibly undermine the unity and purity of the nation. Part of the imagination of the nation is the idea.
that the nation’s past grows rampant in a dark, shadowy place, from where it clandestinely encroaches upon the nation. Insofar as the nation is an imagined community (Anderson 1991), it is in part imagined in opposition to the loyalties and identities it has only partially and incompletely left behind. In other words, religion – increasingly in the form of Islam – is conceived as the biggest threat to the Dutch nation, which was firmly linked to Christianity and a history of religious ‘pillarization’ until the 1960s, when it radically embraced secularism. In contrast, the Pakistani nation is imagined in opposition to particularistic loyalties that undermine Muslim equality that forms the basis of the Pakistani nation.

The way I use the metaphor of the shadow is thus somewhat different from the way the metaphor has been used more often in subversive politics. More common is the concept of the shadow state. As Ranajit Guha (1999) has argued for rural India, revolts and revolutions usually reproduce the prevailing notions and symbols of authority while trying to change them. This is also often true for modern left-wing activities. Perhaps the most paradoxical example is the 19th century founder of Russian terrorism, Sergey Nechayev, who wrote a *Catechism of the Revolutionist* while promoting anarchist atheism. He had apparently no other model than a catechism to spread his anti-Church – and anti-state – message. In the 20th century, various left-wing groups have established ‘shadow states’ – parallel states or counter-republics that copied the organization of the state while combating it (Hansen & Stepputat 2001: 35). In addition to this, the modern state, while priding itself for its bureaucratic and democratic transparency, also maintains a ‘shadow’ or ‘secret’ domain in the form of secret services fighting subversive political activities and organizations. The existence of such secret organizations has given rise to collective fear, fascination and even admiration for such figures as spies and sleepers, moles and terrorists – a fascination that has most superbly been described by Joseph Brodsky (1995) in an essay on master-spy Kim Philby. During the Cold War period, the struggle going on in this secret sphere was one framed in terms of ideology: Marxism versus Capitalism. Today, however, the threat is rather perceived as a threat of culture or even civilization. That implies that not only the state is perceived to be in danger, but the nation – or civilization – as well. I suggest, however, that this cultural danger threatening the nation from a dark and less than transparent domain in fact reflects the insecurities of national identity defined in terms of what it rejects and represses. It is this perceived cultural threat that I call the nation’s shadow.

I suggest, then, that this domain of the nation’s shadow is a good place to look for present-day political scandals and rumors. Here we find the moles and maniacs who refuse to keep their private beliefs and preferences to themselves. Instead they engage in all kinds of secret activities that spoil the nation from within – that is, from its shadow or repressed past. To shed some light on these shadows I will in the remaining part of this essay examine the public debates in Pakistan and the Netherlands since September 2001. As for Pakistan, the focus will not only be on Musharraf’s reformulation of Pakistan as a liberal, modern, progressive Muslim nation, but also on corruption as an ongoing national scandal that undermines the purity of the nation. In the case of the Netherlands, I will argue that sexual identities and lifestyles have been replaced by religious, mainly Islamic, identities and lifestyles as the main form of social critique and political protest. This indicates that tolerance of sexual identities and lifestyles has become the dominant norm taking prevalence over tolerance of religious identities and lifestyles. As a result, religion rather than sex has become the domain of the dark and scandalous, undermining the purity of the nation.

**Pakistan**

The argument I want to make here is an elaboration of earlier work on the state, nation building, and the role of the secret intelligence agencies within Pakistan society (Verkaai 2001). Secret intelligence services, in the local vernacular known as *agencies*, play an important role in public discourse. There is no doubt that
various of such agencies are active in Pakistan. During my research on an ethnic-religious movement in the south of Pakistan, known as the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), I noticed that various state forces infiltrated in neighborhoods to spy on the local members of this movement. The most well known is the ISI, the Inter Services Intelligence, which is the army-run agency and generally considered to be the most efficient and dangerous of all, but other agencies run by the paramilitary Rangers and local police forces are also active. Since these state forces are to a large extent politicized, they also spy on each other. To some extent, then, Pakistan is comparable to the state of Rumania prior to the fall of Ceaucescu in 1989, where, as Katherine Verdery (1996) has described, the Securitate managed to keep the Rumanian population under control by way of its secret manipulation and fearful reputation. However, there are also differences. Because the agencies are fragmented and often busy with each other, state control through covert activities is far from complete. Few people have personal experience with people working for one of the agencies. Nonetheless, there is general consensus in Pakistan that the influence of the agencies is enormous. Ethnic riots, sectarian terrorist attacks, and even the rise of successful popular movements are seen as the work of the agencies, primarily the ISI. More generally, there is a collective suspicion that there exists a secret and invisible domain of political activities that because of its very invisibility is considered more real and more powerful than the public sphere. Drawing on the work of Philip Abrams (1988), Timothy Mitchell (1991 & 1999) and others on the reification of the state as a cultural concept of hegemonic power that exists apart from and beyond society, I have suggested that this domain of secret activities is important in imagining the state. On the one hand, the state institutions that are visible are perceived by the public as notoriously inadequate, ineffective, corrupt, and fragmented. Many commentators have written about the lack of authority and the crisis of governability because of this. On the other hand, however, the Pakistani state is not a weak state. Its authority depends on the notion of a secret state that is everything the visible state is not: unified, efficient, disciplined, and ruthless. Insofar as the state in its reified form is believed to be simultaneously invisible and omnipresent, this secret domain with the agencies as its main actors is its perfect symbol.

This notion of the secret state is linked with another crucial aspect of the public debate in Pakistan since the 1990s, which is corruption or lack of accountability (ehtasab). Again, what we have here is as much, if not more, a product of the collective imagination as a fact of social life. It is doubtful whether practices deemed as corrupt—such as nepotism, bribery, or returning favors—take place more often now than in previous time, but the talk of corruption has certainly multiplied. This is to a large extent the result of the fact that the five prime ministers who have been in office since 1985 have been dismissed by the president on charges of corruption. These prime ministers include Muhammad Khan Junejo in 1988, Benazir Bhutto in 1990, Nawaz Sharif in 1993, Benazir Bhutto a second time in 1996, and finally Nawaz Sharif again in 1999. Time and again, the military—either directly or via the president—has called for a nation-wide campaign to get rid of corruption. In 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif even made this into the most important goal for his government, setting up special courts known as accountability or ehtasah branches that would investigate the bank accounts of all major politicians and bureaucrats. Before long, however, these branches were themselves accused of corruption. When in 1999 General Musharraf took over power by way of a coup, he mentioned this to argue that democratic politics had gone morally bankrupt, which indeed gave the military take-over some, albeit not much, credibility. In other words, although the military has been in the barracks between 1988 and 1999 and has not directly been involved in politics, it has successfully managed to discredit the main political parties as corrupt and not worthy of the mandate given to them by the people. Moreover, it was supported in this by various international development agencies and Western aid donors, which also regularly blamed the Pakistani government for insufficient transparency and a lack of good governance. As
corruption had become a news item, journalists often reported on such statements, even if they came from representatives of obscure – from a Pakistani point of view – countries like the Netherlands. Given all this, General Musharraf met with little popular or international opposition when he exiled or jailed a large number of politicians from the established political parties, successfully creating a political vacuum, which in the short run strengthened his position as the country’s strong leader, while in the long run potentially paving the way for radical Islamist parties that largely escaped persecution, legitimized as an operation against the national disease number one, namely corruption.

The popular explanation for corruption is also to be found in the same secret domain in which the intelligence agencies operate. It is also here where the notion of the nation’s unresolved relation with its past come in play. In popular perception, corruption is the result of a mental deficit of discipline necessary to control loyalties, sentiments, and tendencies that are considered unpatriotic and un-Islamic. Such loyalties, sentiments, and tendencies are rooted in backwardness. In passing, I would like to ask the reader to make a mental note of this notion of backwardness, which will return in the discussion on Fortuyn in Holland. But first I will explain the role of backwardness in Pakistan.

To do this, it is important to realize that the imagination of the Pakistani nation is firmly rooted in 19th century South Asian, Islamic reformist movements of various kinds (Metcalf 1982). All these intellectual movements shared a renewed interest in the message of Islam in relation to British colonialism and the decline of Muslim dominance in North India. These movements were culturalist movements in the sense that they searched for reasons for Muslim decline in Muslim mentalities. Islam as such was of course not blamed. Instead it was argued that the Muslims of India had neglected the liberating and empowering message of Islam, corrupting it with ‘innovations’ (bid‘at), that is, un-Islamic influences from other – mainly Hindu or Western – cultures. Muslim reform became the basis for Pakistani nationalism through the works of Muhammad Iqbal, poet, philosopher, politician, and widely revered in Pakistan as the intellectual founder of the nation – the most prestigious university of the country is named after him. For Iqbal, Pakistan was not merely a way to free the Muslims from Hindu dominance, but also a project to restore true Islam. According to Iqbal, Islam had become invaded with debilitating passivity and world-renouncing mysticism, which had cut the Muslims off from modernity. Local saints and mullahs symbolized the mental backwardness of the Muslims and they were therefore often the target of his sarcasm and scorn. The Muslims needed to return to the tradition of rational investigation or ijtehad – a term akin to jihad, but without the connotation of either mystical or military purification of temptation and infidelity. He therefore deemed education of the utmost importance to free the Muslims of local, folk, fake Islam and bring them back to the world of things.

As regional loyalties were the largest hindrance to nation building in the early years of Pakistan, the political and cultural elite soon translated Iqbal’s disdain for folk Muslim traditions into a rejection of regional or ethnic culture, which was deemed un-Islamic and perverted by Hindu influences. A well-known example of this can be found in the autobiography of General Ayub Khan, who wrote about the Bengalis of former East Pakistan that they ‘belong to the very original Indian races’, ‘have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence’, and ‘have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom’ (Ayub Khan 1967: 187). Other ethnic groups were asked to leave behind their traditions and join progress. Moreover, every ethnic group was considered to have its own unique form of backwardness that stood in the way of true Islam and true patriotism. The Sindhis had feudalism and believed in the miraculous powers of local holy men. The Pathans or Pakhtun from the north had their tribal laws and codes of honor. The Punjabis were generally believed to be prone to kinship or biradari loyalties. As the last and smallest officially recognized ethnic group, the Baluchis were mainly too insignificant to be entitled to
their own ethnic form of backwardness.

Corruption, then, is basically explained from the continuing covert influence of these ethnic forms of backwardness. The corruption of a Sindhi politician will typically be attributed to the fact that he belongs to a traditionally feudal society, where arrangements of power are not made rationally and bureaucratically on the basis of social equality as confirmed by both Islam and nationalism, but according to vertical and hierarchical bonds of birth. Hence, it is always pointed out that the Bhutto family – as the most well-known and, to some, most corrupt Sindhi clan – belong to the largest landowning families in the province. The Punjabi politician’s corruption, however, will rather be explained from kinship or even caste politics, in which the biradari operates as a political unit on its own with no room for outsiders. Likewise, the Pathan is considered an essentially tribal person, who may fight infidelity under the banner of jihad, but who eventually will let tribal loyalty prevail over Muslim brotherhood. Moreover, as all these loyalties have been discredited over the years as un-Islamic and unpatriotic, they are widely believed to have gone underground. They have been pushed into that secret domain that exists under the surface of Muslim brotherhood, national solidarity, democracy, and bureaucratic transparency. These are, in other words, the loyalties, sentiments, and tendencies that inform the secret politics of the agencies.

It is against this background that the post-’911’ public debates in Pakistan have to be understood. Over the last few decades, the Pakistani nation has been defined less in opposition to the external ‘Other’ – primarily India – than to its own past of ethnic, tribal, or kinship backwardness. This is an aspect of Pakistani politics that many foreign analysts, focusing on international relations rather than domestic public debate, have failed to recognize. General Musharraf’s contention that Pakistan is essentially a modern, liberal, and progressive nation may seem peculiar and opportunistic to those who primarily associate Pakistan with recent radical Muslim groups and the state-sponsored ‘Islamization program’ of the 1980s, but it rather is a neither illogical nor unpredictable return to the intellectual tradition of Muhammad Iqbal, subsequently turned into an authoritarian, progressive modernism by the military regime of General Ayub Khan. Musharraf has not only mentioned his predecessor from the 1960s as one of his role models, but has also declared to be inspired by other Muslim modernists from the past such as Gamal Nasser of Egypt. Naturally, Musharraf has been wise not to mention similar Muslim progressive modernists from the Ba`ath Party in Syria and Iraq. On the other hand, the continuity that lies behind this recent reformulation of national identity may be logical and consistent, it is another question whether it works or whether it will be successful. The return to Pakistan’s intellectual tradition of its early decades can also be interpreted as a sign of ideological poverty. After all, from the military establishment’s point of view, the moles undermining the unity of the nation are no longer protest movements organized along ethnic or tribal lines, but Islamist groups calling for jihad and the implementation of the Islamic law (shar’at). Although Musharraf has banned some of these groups after September 2001, which is in itself a break with the recent past when the government rather tried to pacify them and collaborate with them, it is questionable whether the discourse of Muslim liberal modernism will prove to be powerful enough as an alternative to a popular-based Islamism disseminated through Quranic schools, political parties, and some of the media. For the military, the social groups depending on them, as well as the US, it may be a matter of concern to see that General Musharraf cannot do better than to fall back on an ideology of the 1950s and 1960s that has been tried before but may be outdated today. On the other hand, it is in line with a more general revival of authoritarian modernism since ‘911’, that can also be witnessed in for instance the US and also the Netherlands, the latter being the topic of the following section.

The Netherlands

Halfway, the short but dramatic political career of Pim Fortuyn, his ambitions to become the leader of a new populist party that would change the Dutch political spectrum, seemed to come to
This happened in the winter of 2001–2002, a couple of months after September 11. During the summer of 2001 he had joined a new party called Leefbaar Nederland (‘Liveable Netherlands’), which had done well in local elections challenging established parties with an aggressively no-nonsense approach to local issues. A former sociologist teaching Leninist-Marxism at the University of Groningen who failed to make a career in the labor party (Partij van de Arbeid), Fortuyn was already a controversial figure because of the sarcastic and unorthodox columns he used to write for a right-wing weekly magazine. He was, however, also a gifted speaker and he had wealthy friends in the real estate and construction branch who were willing to support him financially, which made him acceptable as a leader for the Leefbaar Nederland party. Shortly after ‘911’, however, a television news show called Nova reported on an imam in Rotterdam who had branded homosexuality a disease. This attracted some media attention, partly because everything on Islam was considered a hot issue after ‘911’, partly because it raised the question whether the freedom of speech act can be reconciled with the anti-discrimination laws on sexual preferences, race, and religion. In an interview in a national newspaper, commenting on this affair, Fortuyn called Islam a ‘backward culture’. This created a stir, Fortuyn was accused of Islam phobia, and the party he was supposed to lead in the coming elections decided to dismiss him. Everyone expected Fortuyn to go back to writing columns, but instead he started his own party, bluntly called List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), which subsequently became the media darling in the 2002 election campaign.

The fact that Fortuyn was so widely criticized for calling Islam a backward culture seems to indicate that he was saying something most people considered unacceptable and intolerable. To some extent this was true, but at the same time he was only saying too directly and too crudely what many established politicians, media experts, and newspaper columnists from conservative, liberal, and progressive background had been saying more elegantly in the aftermath of ‘911’. Moreover, although his bluntness may have been new and revolting, the idea that religion – Islam in this case – has something to do with backwardness is a central notion in the Dutch self-image since the 1960s. Since ‘911’ I have been to many panel discussions where otherwise reasonable speakers insisted that there was inherently nothing wrong with the Dutch Muslims other than that they had not yet been through a process of secularization, like the Protestants and Catholics had been since the 1960s. In discussions on the position of Muslim women in Holland, it was similarly stated that all problems would come to an end as soon as the Dutch Muslim women would liberate themselves from patriarchal religious values just as non-Muslim women had done in the feminist wave of the 1970s. In other words, although few people would call Islam a backward culture, the notion that Muslims are lagging behind is widespread and linked to the Dutch experience of secularization in a not so distant past.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, religion is at best considered a private matter, or otherwise condemned and ridiculed as irrational and backward. Part of the cultural transition that took place in those years was a so-called process of ‘deconfessionalization’, in which many people left the religious community – Protestant, Catholic, and, one may add, socialist – in which they had spent most of their social, economic, recreational, and political life. This breaking away from religion was often a traumatic affair, considering the huge pile of novels written in those years by young authors who broke with their religious upbringing, discovering a world of free cultural, spiritual, and sexual expression. Insofar as they exist, spiritual wishes are now generally met by a range of new practices from New Age, Buddhism, Shamanism, Sufism, etc. The role of the established religions in public and political life, however, is often considered a thing of the past, in particular by the 1960s and 1970s generation. All the same, their freedom from religion is also considered a delicate achievement that can easily be threatened and taken away. In that sense, recent Muslim migrants in Holland not only struggle with language problems, unemployment, and bad housing conditions, but also with a dominant public discourse that project traumatic past
experiences with a hierarchical, community-based, sexually repressive, women-unfriendly form of Calvinism onto Islam.

Dutch radical secularization can be explained from a pre-1960s past of pillarization. Starting in the 19th century up to the 1950s, the various churches played a crucial role in the centralizing project that turned peasants, merchants, and fishermen into Dutchmen (Van Rooden 1999). This was done by way of so-called pillars (zuilen) or ‘own worlds’. Zuilen were configurations of organizations – political, educational, social, recreational, and to some extent economic – based on religious affiliation. Apart from a cultural and political elite, most people lived and raised their children within those pillars. The religious organizations at the head of those pillars functioned as intermediaries between citizens and the state, so much so that politics was to a very large extent first and foremost church politics. This came to a rather abrupt end in the 1960s and 1970s, when a process of depillarization (ontzuiling) was set in motion, which forced the churches into a more ecumenical spirit leading to the joining together of various Catholic and Protestant political parties into one Christian Democrat Alliance (CDA) in the late 1970s. For the then young generation breaking out of their pillars, religion seemed outdated, petty bourgeois, oppressive, and on the decline. Perhaps the most articulate expression of this trend is a party called Democrats ‘66 (D66), a left-of-center, liberal, modernist party, established in 1966, which became the fourth-biggest party in Holland and the initiator in 1994 of the purple coalition of Labor and Liberals, which sent the Christian Democrats into the opposition for the first time in Dutch parliamentary history.

However, there was another element to pillarization – a more elusive way or tradition of dealing with difference and diversity – that was not so easily thrown overboard. I am alluding here to a culture of tolerance or indifference, beautifully analyzed by Halleh Ghorashi in a study on the encounter of Iranian refugees with Dutch society. According to Ghorashi (2001: chapter 11), depillarization has indeed led to a strong dislike or distrust of religion-based political identities, but depillarization has not eroded the concept of ‘minding your own business’, that was at the root of the more or less peaceful coexistence of various religious communities. Difference was accepted as long as its expression remained limited within the boundaries of the pillars. Within your own church, so to speak, you were free to do everything that would not be tolerated in broad daylight. This went with a certain degree of suspicion about possibly peculiar practices going on in somebody else’s church or religious community. However, Dutch tolerance – a central feature of national self-image in recent years – primarily meant not probing into these potentially funny businesses of the other. This informed and influenced the way Dutch society dealt with the emerging multicultural society in the 1980s and 1990s. Tolerance toward minorities translated as respect for boundaries of identity rather than cultural interaction. Minorities were for instance allowed education in their own language and ‘with respect for their own culture’. In this way, Dutch-style multiculturalism promoted and strengthened cultural boundaries in order to be better able to respect and tolerate them. Much less attention was given to social-economic and political aspects of migration and integration. As a result, minorities tend to have a weak social-economic position, are poorly integrated in the political process, and have a strong sense of cultural difference. The attitude toward minorities that led to these results has been characterized as ‘hugging them to death’, meaning that minorities were pampered because of cultural differences, but not allowed an equal position politically and socio-economically (cf. Kaschuba 1995).

‘September 11’ of course led to a public debate on possible explanations and interpretations of the attacks. For a long time, there was no attention at all for factors such as the ambivalent strategic relations between the US, its allies, and political Islam; the internal dynamics within a heavily-armed modern mercenary army with no cause and under threat of losing its main sponsors; or the poor and often violent experiences young, ambitious, and desperate men have with authoritarian states in the Middle East and Asia oppressing political parties and social movements in the name of democracy.
and free speech. Instead one looked for reasons within Islam and its history. Headlines in national newspapers and weeklies stating that ‘there is something wrong with Islam’ (e.g. Frentrop 2001) articulated a wider sentiment that Islam lacked a tradition of tolerance and secularization. A D66 member of parliament suggested that an Islamic Voltaire was needed. Others proposed that a Muslim Kant or Tocqueville would be more appropriate. In other words, no distinctions were made between Islam and a rather recent line of political philosophy known as political Islam, let alone between various forms of political Islam. One looked for explanations in tradition instead of present-day power conflicts. And by juxtaposing Islam and Western civilization, one also retreated into a hard-line modernist notion of the West as the product of the Enlightenment in which colonialism, the World Wars, the Holocaust, etc., have no place. Small wonder that Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1997) became a bestseller and was translated in Dutch under a title that left out the second part of the original title. In this climate, Pim Fortuyn’s remarks on Islam’s backwardness only stood out for its rude and unsophisticated use of language.

This soon had ramifications for the way the Dutch Muslims were looked at. For if indeed something was wrong with Islam, then how could one expect Muslims to be part of a modern, secular society, playing the game according to the rules of “minding your own business”? A clear example of this line of thought was given when Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a member of parliament for the right-wing liberal party and a migrant from Somalia, said that to modern, Western standards, the Prophet Muhammad was a pervert, suggesting that the sexual oppression of female Muslim migrants was essentially a problem of Islam that could not be solved as long as one remained a Muslim. Moreover, not only Islam was attacked, but also the policy of tolerance (gedoogbeleid) of the 1980s and 1990s. As initially one of his most provocative and “mediagenic” demands, Pim Fortuyn asked for a much more stringent policy of assimilation – a point that was later adopted in a more disguised form by mainstream parties such as the Christian Democrats when they stressed the importance of social cohesion and sharing a set of norms and values that remained unspecified.

Since ‘911’, problems of migration, integration, and social inequality have been defined primarily as a cultural problem. At the root lie particular religious mentalities. Moderates take this as Muslims lagging behind – a problem that can be dealt with by education and possibly affirmative action programmes. Hardliners instead see it as a problem of contrasting and clashing cultures, and they are therefore no longer willing to accept the old concept of minding your own business within your own community.

The old Dutch embarrassment of wanting to know what goes on in somebody else’s church but not daring to satisfy this desire out of considerations of decency is turned into a more aggressive suspicion about possible anti-social and subversive activities taking place in culturally exclusive spaces such as mosques or Muslim schools. This takes a radical form in the fear for militant groups recruiting large numbers of young Dutch Muslim males for jihad – a fear fostered by ill-researched reports of the Dutch secret intelligence service (AIVD) on Muslim terrorist activities in the Netherlands, resulting in court cases against accused terrorists which the public prosecutor fails to win because of insufficient evidence. The same fear is also evident in the hostile reactions against the Arab European League (AEL), established in Belgium by the young and charismatic Abu Jahjah and possibly becoming a political platform for angry young Muslims in the Netherlands too. Politicians from right wing and conservative parties, however, see it as a movement engaged in undermining and subversive activities and therefore demanded that the AEL be banned before the Dutch branch was even established.

Insofar as problems of multiculturalism can be explained in cultural terms, it is clear that the dominant Dutch discourse on cultural and religious differences is as much at stake as the cultural and religious mentalities of the migrants. What has clashed in Holland since ‘911’ is not Islam versus Western civilization, but an ideology of secularism and personal
freedom that came of age in the 1960s versus its shadow that is projected onto Islam. Increasingly, Islam is defined as the exact opposite of everything people in Holland have fought for since the 1960s: free sexual expression, gender equality, individualism. To some extent, these struggles have been won. The best evidence for this is of course the extreme popularity of Pim Fortuyn, an openly homosexual dandy, among male supporters of Feijenoord, a working class soccer team in Rotterdam, and other groups otherwise prone to homophobia. Another example: during the 2003 election campaign, Jan Peter Balkenende, prime minister and leader of the Christian Democrats, let himself be interviewed daily by two young female TV reporters, one of whom is the anchorwoman of a TV show called Neuen doe je zo (‘This is how to fuck’), and the other one being sex symbol number one among Dutch male teenagers. Apart from the sexual abuse of children, sex has lost its potential for scandal. But while the pre-1960s generation was obsessed with sexual mores, today’s generation is preoccupied with religion. Islam in particular is seen as a threat to the newly won freedom. The editor of the main feminist magazine Opzij, for instance, obstinately refuses to employ Muslim journalists wearing headscarves, saying that she will not allow the achievements of her generation to be destroyed by Muslim migrants, and thus bringing the almost defeated impact of religion in through the backdoor. In sum, the progressive elite has more in common with Pim Fortuyn then it is willing to admit.

Conclusion

In the cases I have described, we see renewed debate on national identity after the suicide attacks of ‘911’. This reflection on the nation brings to the surface at least two observations. First, there is a reaffirmation of the ideological pillars of the nation. In Pakistan, it is reformist and modernist Islam in the tradition of Muhammad Iqbal. In the Netherlands, it is secularism and personal freedom of lifestyle and sexual preferences. Second, while re-emphasising the nation’s ideological foundations, it also stresses what the nation is not. I have called the flipside of this national identity the nation’s shadow, indicating that it sticks with the nation whatever moves it makes. Hence, the more Islam is stressed as the unifying force of the Pakistani nation, the greater the suspicion that ethnic, tribal, or kinship loyalties and sentiments will undermine the nation. The more it is argued that secularism is the basis of the modern Dutch nation, the greater the fear that new religious mentalities in the form of Muslim migrants will bring back a traumatic national past.

Ideological conflicts thus become more polarized and charged, but these conflicts are more specific and concrete than the much-discussed clashes of civilizations – even though it is clear that more global discourses are at play in both cases. In Holland, renewed and crudely polarized Orientalist stereotypes about Muslims clearly affect the public debate on multicultural society, whereas in Pakistan we see the impact of global discourses on good governance and transparency in the debate about corruption. Nonetheless, these global notions, images, and fantasies are shaped and translated in national contexts to come to a starker contrast between the nation and its shadow. Part of this polarization is the increasing fear of subversive, undermining activities, symbolized by such figures as moles, spies, and sleeper-terrorists. Similarly, the stark juxtaposition of the nation against its shadow increases the number of scandals and rumors, the nature of which also indicates the central aspects of the nation’s self-image. Thus, we have seen an unprecedented number of scandals and rumors connected to the renewed reflection on the place of Muslim migrants in Dutch society over the last two years. In Pakistan, scandals and rumors are about corruption caused by a range of unpatriotic and un-Islamic loyalties. As a hypothesis for further research, then, I conclude by suggesting that the bigger the political scandals and the more fearful the rumors about subversive, undermining activities, the more intense the debate on national identity.
References

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