Alias ‘Yusuf Galán’

Neighbors, Sleepers, and the Violence of Recognition in Urban Spain¹

Dorothy Noyes


The arrests of alleged Al-Qaeda members in Spain reactivated a longstanding local discourse on the insoluble tensions between individual, state, and community. In two 19th century fictions and two 21st century news stories, I show how the figure of the neighbor and the framing device of the façade are invoked to explore the limitations – both negative and positive – of the liberal project in Spain. In these façade narratives, the twin behaviors of secrecy and display call attention to an imbalance between the private space of the individual and the public space of the community. The state proving inadequate as a regulator of the commerce between these two spheres, equilibrium is restored through an act of violence across the façade that separates them. This violence is at the same time the means by which individuals are accorded social recognition.

Dorothy Noyes, Associate Professor of Folklore and English, The Ohio State University, Mershon Center, 1501 Neil Ave., Columbus OH 43201.
E-mail: noyes.10@osu.edu

On November 13, 2001, the Spanish police in Madrid arrested eleven men said to be members of a “sleeper cell” providing logistical support to Al-Qaeda in the organization of the September 11 attacks. As it happened, one of the men lived nearly next door to some friends of mine in a middle-class neighborhood of 19th century apartment houses in central Madrid. Unlike the others arrested, naturalized Spaniards of Syrian or Maghrebin origin, he was a native Spaniard converted to Islam, with a Moroccan wife. In newspaper accounts he was presented as “Luis José Galán González, alias ‘Yusuf Galán.’”

My friend remarked on the conspicuous incoherence of Galán’s conduct prior to his arrest. Arab music often blared forth from Galán’s open window, and he sometimes left the house in Saudi-style white robes, far more emphatic than the typical dress of Muslim men in Spain. At the same time, he was known for tossing his garbage out on the street, and it was “always full of vodka bottles.” “It seemed both impossible that he was and impossible that he wasn’t what he was.”

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Judicial investigation confirmed Galán’s connections to Al-Qaeda: he had trained in an Indonesian camp, had arms and documents in his apartment, and was extensively networked with other members of the cell. But Galán was not a model “sleeper”; rather, as my friend had observed, he had a record of calling attention to himself. He shouted out agreement during sermons at his mosque in Madrid; shortly before his arrest he had grabbed the microphone to make speeches at demonstrations against the Afghan war. When CNN visited his mosque after September 11 to canvas Muslim opinion, he was one of those interviewed, praising the Taliban and saying nothing against the attacks. Polaroids were found showing Galán in the Indonesian camp, wearing mujahedeen garb, loaded down with arms, and surrounded by comrades, surprising evidence for a member of a terrorist cell to leave lying around his apartment. Moreover, Galán had participated to a lesser degree in a variety of movements: in 1989 he had served as an electoral monitor for the Basque radical nationalist party Herri Batasuna, and more recently he had participated in antiglobalization protests. He was an enthusiast for martial arts, studying karate in Madrid with an Indonesian aviation engineer who also joined Al-Qaeda, and Olympic shooting, practicing at the range of the military casino in central Madrid. The Barcelona newspaper La Vanguardia summed him up as “a curious character” (31 January 2002).

The flamboyant Spanish Catholic-born Galán seems like the inverse of most of the “sleeper” arrested since September 11, Muslim immigrant men living discreetly in Europe with all the outward signs of assimilation. But his case opens up the same questions. As Simmel suggests, secrecy and display both serve to enhance the value of the person, and both thus call for Anerkennung, acknowledgment from others – or what the current multicultural discussion in the U.S. calls “recognition.” More deeply, the question is one of how personhood is shaped by the eyes of others, a matter especially problematic for these interstitial men who were not certain who their others were.

Much ink has spilled in recent years over the panoptical gaze by which institutions discipline individuals into internalizing control (Foucault 1979). But despite the atrocities perpetrated by church and state in Spanish history, we should not forget that direct institutional surveillance is of less importance to most individuals and perhaps less influence in the overall national trajectory than the gaze of the neighbors. One can say the same, to be sure, for any state that is not outright Stalinist, and even then we should remember that the state generally lacks the resources to live up to its repressive ambitions. Primary selfhood is formed and maintained, as symbolic interactionism teaches us, in the everyday gaze between equals.

Another scholarly account of the gaze has the virtue of reminding us of the material relations beneath social constructions: this is the levelling gaze of envy and social control, as described by Mediterranean anthropologists of the Anglo-American old school. The most sophisticated critiques of this work have recognized that several themes of it – including, I would argue, the structural-functionalist emphasis on equilibrium – are not purely extrinsic impositions, but draw heavily upon prominent local metadiscourses (e.g. Herzfeld 1987). Its blind spots stem in part from insufficient reflexivity on this point: its real object is not community realities, but a certain body of collective representations.

Here I want to begin to explore one set of such representations in Spain (and I stress the preliminary, provisional character of the present article). There is a Spanish tradition of narrative, iconography, and performance elaborated around the façades of private houses, churches, and government buildings, often symbolically equated as enclosures keeping goods out of public circulation (Noyes 1995). The enclosure is an enlargement of the person (individual or corporate), and its surface is similarly maintained and adorned to assert respectability before the neighbors.

In traditional Spanish ritual life, façade performances (balcony decoration, serenading, luck-visit, charivari, etc.) create occasions of exchange between interiors and the street. The owners of enclosures provide careful glimpses of their interiors, proclaiming that they have nothing to hide. On the other side of the façade,
the gaze (and sometimes more violent penetration) of the street demands a share of what is enclosed: demands intensified by an excess of secrecy as by an excess of display. A labile membrane between the public and private realms, the façade regulates the equilibrium between them. Imbalances are addressed by forced entry from without, or fortification from within.7

Façade performances constitute part of the traditional public sphere in western societies, never entirely displaced by the Habermasian bourgeois variety (1989). In Spain the deficiencies of the latter have contributed to the continuing vitality of the former. Frequent political upheavals, long periods of de jure or de facto censorship, extreme social inequalities limiting access to education, and deep ideological divisions have all contributed to a fragmented civil society with many discontinuities. Encounters between different interests still occur most meaningfully within real public space – where difference cannot be forever evaded – and through symbolic performance, a safer vehicle for divisive messages than expository prose.

This local public sphere – which generally maps onto a neighborhood – is at once the framework in which political relationships can be worked out and the site at which they can be gauged and evaluated. And while façade performances appear to be transactions between the community and the individual, the state makes a constant and uneasy third. Identity is contested between the three. The community grants social personhood; the individual creates herself; the state makes the citizen. These three processes are deeply intertwined historically and in the present, but none can successfully be elided with the others. Jacobin modernity has failed to reduce the community to the state or the individual to the citizen. Liberal modernity has failed to reduce community to the aggregation of private individuals or the state to their guarantor. Fundamentalist modernity has as yet made no convincing effort to reduce the state or the individual to embodiments of “community values” (a.k.a. the voice of God).

In this paper I will look at the façade narrative as a space of Spanish reflection upon liberal modernity and thus on the status of the individual. Historically in Western thought, Spain stands for two extremes of the latter. The Black Legend credits Spain with the mother of all repressive regimes, the Inquisition in the service of empire. The Romantic reaction points to the Spanish love of individual independence – “liberalism” as a political ideology was, after all, a Spanish coinage, and anarchism became, as nowhere else in the world, a serious political project.8 This second stereotype has a long history within Spain itself (cf. Castro 1971, 1:300), and is still current. But despite the routine complaint that no political project can get anywhere in the face of the kneejerk individualist “¡Abajo los de arriba!,” partisan affiliation is for many an important component of personal identity and a means of self-distinction within community settings. And community is present too in a continuing sense of claustrophobia and constraint expressed by individuals.

Four narrations follow: two 19th century fictions, two 21st century news stories. Each dramatizes a different dynamic between community, state, and individual, mediated around an act of violence at the domestic façade. In each, the relationship between the householder and the neighbors is used to comment on the limitations of the liberal project in Spain.

The Neighbors Admire

My first narrative dates from 1833 and received a critical revision in 1878. It addresses the relationship of neighbors, individuals, and the state in Barcelona, taking as its historical moment the July 1833 swearing-in of the Infanta Isabel as heiress to the throne of the dying Fernando VII. The event was preceded by Queen María Cristina’s accommodation with the moderate liberal faction at court, intended to secure support for her daughter’s claim, and an amnesty granted to the 10,000 Spanish liberals who had been exiled during various phases of political reaction since the 1814 restoration of the Bourbon dynasty. The event was preceded by Queen María Cristina’s accommodation with the moderate liberal faction at court, intended to secure support for her daughter’s claim, and an amnesty granted to the 10,000 Spanish liberals who had been exiled during various phases of political reaction since the 1814 restoration of the Bourbon dynasty. Moderate royalists as much as moderate liberals welcomed these developments, which they saw as a means of fending off extremisms on both sides, and the urban bourgeois welcomed the prospect of
peace after twenty-five years of instability and civil violence (Vicens Vives 1967:127). Nationwide festivities were declared and urgently promoted by the local authorities; in the liberal coastal cities, the more radical masses participated energetically in the celebration, which was thus ambiguously one of national reconciliation or one of liberal triumph. Not surprisingly, the show of reconciliation could not sustain itself, and immediately after the death of the king the conservatives inaugurated the seven-year First Carlist War to install their own claimant to the throne.

Josep Robrenyo, a popular liberal actor and author of artisanal background (Fàbregas 1975:127–131), wrote a comic sainet (a one-act play about contemporary life) on the Barcelona celebration of the jura de la Infanta.10 “La Union ó la Tia Sacallona” (sic) was performed on September 3, two months after the celebration and one month before the first Carlist insurrection, and the timing explains both its political caution and its didactic character, intended “to intensify the civic attitude of citizens in a moment when the external signs of participation were important” (Romea Castro 1994: 55).

In a “very simple” household, neighbors are collecting money and material to decorate their street for the celebration. Although the modest artisan Sagimon and his wife Madrona indicate the neighborhood’s sociological center of gravity, class boundaries are overcome for the festival. The rich neighbor Don Julián comes in to offer his assistance and ultimately pays for most of the decoration, while the two poorest neighbors, male and female, are reported as having each donated a day’s wage. Sagimon’s old comrade-in-arms brings his family from the country to see the festival, and goes touring every street of the city, reporting to the company on the beauty of the decorations and of the city itself, then undergoing extensive renovations to improve the hygiene, the legibility, and the visual dignity of its medieval infrastructure (Romea Castro 1994). All praise the restoration of “just laws” and the amnesty that has reunited families.

Two sources offer the potential to disrupt the social harmony promised by the new political order: one public and masculine, one private and feminine. Sagimon has had a political quarrel of ten year’s standing with a neighbor. And domestically, Madrona’s aunt Sacallona offers a litany of complaints that embody a longstanding stereotype of the calculating, individualist Catalan character. Everyone has stopped working to celebrate; the festival itself is a waste of money and the hospitality to visitors costs still more; outsiders are to be mistrusted; it is better to stay at home than go gaping around the streets; and so on.

But these two threats are resolved by the force of genre. Tia Sacallona’s arguments are discredited by her structural position: comedy requires her to be expelled without mercy from the community of sympathy. In addition to the calculating class habits that make her a spoilsport, she is a typical duenna, talking endlessly of the decay of the times and universally disapproving the actions of the young. She is politely hated by everyone else in the play, who collectively ridicule her age, tell her to shut up and go to her room, and propose a variety of acts of violence to get rid of her. (To be sure, she takes up a prominent part of the action and gives the play the second half of its name.) As for the external threat, Don Julián forces the two warring neighbors together by appealing to their patriotism: “Cover the past with a veil, let us not remember parties and passions, but union and peace. Cristina forgets, and we cannot forget?” The queen’s amnesty sets the example, and the reconciliation guaranteed by benevolent authority figures is celebrated in a collective patriotic song at the end. The play exploits the full machinery of comedy to show Catalans what they need to overcome if the new political order is to succeed: economic selfishness in private life and historical grudges in public.11

To be sure, economic individualism will have a lengthy afterlife in Catalan politics and is, after all, the whole point of liberalism. An 1878 rewrite of Robrenyo’s normative exhortation points out this paradox and also notes the destructive persistence of memory. “Viva la llibertat!” by Joan Pons i Massaveu (1850–1918) is a “picture of customs,” a genre of realist short fiction that was the mainstay of Spanish periodicals in the mid-19th century. Without any direct reference to Robrenyo’s play, it reproduces...
its setting and format, while challenging its resolution.12

Speaking from the present of the reader, the narrator describes his father Mariano’s participation in the street decoration for the 1833 festival. The alcalde del barri (district mayor) has orders to organize the neighborhood and is conferring with Mariano, the most enthusiastic of the local liberals. There is a contest for the best-adorned street in Barcelona, and a prize for the individual with the best façade; Mariano vows to win this and to spend the money on a feast for the neighborhood. Swearing to pawn even his shirt if necessary, he rents damask cloths, buys sacks of greenery, and appropriates his wife’s best linens, topping off the decoration with his portrait of the queen’s supporter General Espartero, framed by candles and topped with a wreath of laurel. Later, realizing that the display will be invisible at night, he spends all his remaining cash on lights and firecrackers and mounts a show to overcome, visually and sonorally, all conceivable competition.

The interpenetration of self and state is revealed by all kinds of slippage. The slogan “Viva la llibertat!,” spelled out in lights on the façade, opens in the public language of Spanish and closes in the domestic one of Catalan. Mariano’s façade is infinitely permeable and reversible, as he takes out on the balcony elements of the domestic environment, which in turn – notably the General’s portrait – are drawn from the public realm. This permeability is emphasized by the importance of sound in the story, signalling the impinging of the state on the domestic interior. The narrator notes being awakened by the cathedral bells and the liberal “Hymn to Riego,” hearing all day long the songs of the street musicians hired by the district mayor for the celebration, and the intrusion at dusk of the cannons of Barcelona’s fortresses: it is these explosions that inspire Mariano to go out and buy fireworks. Mariano himself spends more time out of the house than in it: once his decorations are up, he spends most of the day going back and forth in the street to listen to the admiring comments of passers-by. He delights in the confirmation of his political identity (“That one is really a liberal!”), and this is his argument for the necessity of participation: “Everyone knows who Mariano is as a liberal.”

As in the sainet, there are two points of interference with Mariano’s integration of self, community, and state. The first is the feminine defender of the domestic interest: this time she is a rational voice, worried about the expense but more about the confusion of public and private spaces. Mariano’s wife scolds him for the mess he is making and is horrified when he brings sacks of fireworks into the house. The narrator implicitly supports his mother’s evaluation of misplaced priorities: he opens by saying that he never saw his father as delighted as on the day that Isabel was sworn, and lists a range of domestic occurrences, such as the birth of grandchildren, as paling by comparison. The domestic events are increasingly colored by politics as they rise in importance to his father: having his wife, after thirteen sons and seven years’ wait, give birth at last to “little Isabel,” who, however, does not live; or the last, winning the lottery after years of betting on “1833.” Mariano’s selfhood is invested entirely in his façade, and he neglects his interior, at a high cost to his domestic others – a strange position for a self-declared liberal. Rather than genuinely promoting the private sphere, Mariano shows a purely contrarian spirit: “Abajo los de arriba!”

For the façade is the site of masculine competition, and here we find again the neighbor of a different political opinion. The house opposite is inhabited by one Senyor Bruno, the sole declared member of the other party on the street. Throughout the story, the two men engage in shouting matches across their balconies,13 and the polarized symmetry of their political identities is clear. When his wife complains, an indignant Mariano demands, “Do you want the neighbors to point the finger at me like they will at that idiot across the street?” Mariano gloats that Senyor Bruno, had his side won, would have filled his balcony with candles and the image of the Virgin rather than that of Espartero, and Bruno agrees, declaring that he would pawn even his pants to do so. They shout reciprocal insults back and forth: “Apostolic!” “Mason!”14 Later, when Mariano is setting off his fireworks, a spark flies through Bruno’s balcony and sets a carpet alight; Bruno puts out
the fire but is transported in rage; Mariano lights still more rockets to drown out his shouting. The next day, Bruno has his revenge, using the neutrality of the state: he files a complaint with the alcalde del barri. The alcalde obliges his friend to pay the fine, preaching the necessity of compromise and coexistence. But the reconciliation is not final, as in “La Union”: Mariano retires vowing to get his own back by leaving “Viva La Llibertat!” lit up on the balcony for the rest of the week for Senyor Bruno’s exclusive benefit.

The reader of 1878 knows that this is not the end of the story either: Senyor Bruno’s faction will shortly inaugurate seven years of civil war, and even that is not the end of the story: the Third Carlist War had just ended in 1875. Nor, indeed, was that to be the end: the polarization of Spanish politics in everyday public space would intensify in the 20th century into appalling face-to-face factional violence and culminate in the Civil War. Despite the satirical tone, repeated parallels are drawn between festival and war: the explosions of fireworks and the explosions of cannon, festival songs and military hymns, the fires of celebration with the arson of private enclosures in civil war (such as the church and factory burnings of 1834–36 in Barcelona). Mariano says at the beginning, “The show on my balcony...I want everyone to talk about it as if it were the burning of Moscow.” Spanish men are seen here as so many would-be Napoleons, imposing themselves on the notice of others through acts of aggressive display.

The Napoleonic reference is not casual. Robrenyo’s play had pointed to the Napoleonic invasion as the founding moment for the present political climate, since the solidarity between the protagonist and his country visitor depends on their shared experience as prisoners of the French; the suggestion is that liberal patriotism is the natural continuation of that shown by the entire population during the War of Independence (Fàbregas 1975, 173).15 Both Robrenyo and Pons depict a founding moment of popular Spanish liberalism, in which a sense of proprietorship in the modern state is grafted on to older forms of civic and individual display. In the triumph of the moment, Robrenyo imagines the elision of person, citizen, and individual; Pons writes when such a vision can no longer be sustained.

The Neighbors Break In

The Catalan wife recovers her dignity completely in the next story. In Narcís Oller’s “La Bufetada” (The Slap), it is 1888 and Tia Sacallona has become a lovely young woman named Anneta, whose commitment to hard work and privacy is now identified as admirable and modern in relation to the values of the street. The continued dominance of the latter is, however, clear from the opening sentence. “About five years ago, the neighbors of Canuda Street saw Anneta’s ironing business open.” The newcomer’s sense of self-respect is evident from her immaculate windows, but she keeps her awnings closed until the day her shop opens, and does not come out to present herself to the neighborhood. The “women of the doorways,” curious, send their children to peer under the awnings, and the boldest eventually goes to investigate directly. Seeing herself spied upon, Anneta comes out to present herself, and thereafter becomes the pride of the neighborhood for her handsome appearance and her industry in setting up, succeeding in, and rapidly expanding a business that is itself emblematic: supporting the starched respectability of, eventually, her entire urban district.

At the same time, she bothers the neighbors. She is a little too good for them: having been a servant of a local marchioness for ten years, her speech and manners are refined enough that “she could pass for a lady in reduced circumstances.” She is reserved: she works constantly and concedes little to sociability. The neighbor reports to the others that she is “very much a woman of her house, and not given to crossing the threshold,” and the neighbors agree, “She would certainly never be one of the club.”

Finally, Anneta’s marriage is unusual. Despite her own refinement, she has married a butcher whom the neighbors define as “savage.” He helps her in her expanding business, which generates four times the income of his own labor, and is seen by the neighbors as under her thumb. Absorbed in each other at the beginning of the story, the two are content with their atypical relationship. In the course of the story,
the neighbors undermine this self-sufficiency. Anneta is already vulnerable to external gazes: she has a fear of “scandals” and is also intensely jealous. The neighbors tease Llorenç and one of the shop workers provokes him sexually. With the voices of the critics in his head, he eventually has a half-hearted flirtation with the woman, who flaunts her position to her coworkers and Anneta herself. When Anneta sends her away, the couple confront each other in a quarrel over “who wears the pants,” each entirely penetrated with a sense of what the neighbors are saying. Exasperated by Anneta’s insistence on the superiority of her own judgment to the communal perception, Llorenç slaps her; she sees this as an unforgivable affront to her dignity and begins packing up to leave him. In desperation, he declares his repentance and determination to avoid all future offences by chopping off his hand with his butcher’s knife.

Anneta and Llorenç are presented as rigid characters from different extremes of a continuum: Llorenç not yet civilized by society, and Anneta more advanced than those around her, more committed to abstract principle, to capitalist practice, and to the separation of public and private spheres. The neighbors have a limited moderating effect on both, and the implication is that weaker characters would submit wholly to the collective gaze and judgment. Anneta and Llorenç succeed in resisting, but with violent consequences to themselves. Social control, by Oller’s judgment, is both civilizing and levelling, frustrating the exceptional and reducing all to a mean which may or may not be golden. When the neighbors’ intrusive gaze penetrates the interior, the air of the street enters the house and changes its atmosphere.

Anneta’s self-debate after the quarrel confirms the spatial concomitants of political dispensations. She imagines herself alone in public space while everyone she knows files past her in a “procession” or its later statist equivalent, a “parade.” In this sphere of representative publicity, she is condemned. But she goes on to envision herself in two alternative, more modern spaces: the theater and the courtroom. In the former, her interiority would be made visible and her spectators would empathize with her position. In the latter space of Habermasian reasoned debate, her judgment would be vindicated. Anneta looks towards a modern public sphere that does not yet exist in Spain.

Verbs of sight and evaluation appear in every paragraph of Oller’s story, along with the curtains and awnings and doors that attempt to limit access. While the state is merely an external point of reference, neighborly surveillance is constant and inescapable. Anneta’s neighbors are, in effect, looking for “sleepers,” a notion that presumes an engaged audience for whom normalcy must be performed, and Anneta is indeed a sleeper of a more gradual kind, insinuating disruptive new social practices under cover of her concessions to neighborhood opinion. The intensity of neighborhood vigilance marks the historical moment in which economic individualism is seen to be breaking up traditional communities; and in this story the relation between individual and social persona is Goffmanesque in its paranoia. Anneta wears a mask for a public from which she feels, to some degree, alienated, and to which her “true self” poses a risk.

The Neighbors Abdicate

Anneta embodies the contradictions of an incomplete liberal project, attempting to live by her own convictions and energies while offering anxious window-dressing to the neighborhood. Yusuf Galán’s case is more extreme. Equally concerned to be independent of society, he requires the confirmation of his neighbors that he is so. Peter Suedfeld has pointed out the surprising give-away behaviors of many of the September 11 “sleepers,” identifying them as an extreme instance of an ever-present tension between the power amassed through secrecy and the psychological need for self-revelation (2003). In the case of many of these men with hybrid cultural practices and no fixed audience of neighbors, one might consider these displays and the violent “awakenings” they seem to forecast as less self-revelation than self-creation. We cannot say of “Yusuf Galán” that he wore a discreet mask of normalcy concealing a threatening true identity. He represents the opposite extreme, theatrically constructing a highly
performative new identity to supplant an original self too undistinguished to be worth recounting.\textsuperscript{18}

Others arrested in the same operation, while less flagrantly self-contradictory than Galán, were ambiguous enough. Several were naturalized Spanish citizens; two had Spanish wives and one married a Finn who converted to Islam. As has been observed of the Al-Qaeda operatives in general, they did not come from a traditional background in which social control would confer an unproblematic social identity – the Muslim equivalent of the old Spanish street life. They were cosmopolitan, multilingual, often Western-educated, and the instability of their identities was dramatized in the oscillations of their everyday conduct, encompassing both drunkenness and mosque attendance.

Did those outward signs even matter? Galán’s theatricality did not prevent him from acting effectively as an Al-Qaeda operative: he trained in an Indonesian camp, housed traveling Al-Qaeda members, and undertook all the other tasks shared by more discreet members of the cell. In contrast to those of our 19th century narratives, the neighbors continually interviewed in both Spanish and foreign coverage of these arrests failed to provide any conclusive interpretations. Neighbors were cited to build up a picture of the suspects through their movements, family relations, visitors, dress, grooming, demeanor, and level of participation in communal activities. The smallest details were sought to provide clues: one man was said to be “jovial,” one cut himself off from observation by wearing dark glasses. Testimonies contradicted each other in tone. Ahmed Brahim, arrested in a prosperous residential suburb of Barcelona in April, was described by one as obviously intelligent, speaking six or seven languages, including French to the neighbor himself. Another called him touchy: after his car was broken into, he placed a sign in the building parking lot announcing the vengeance of Allah on racism. A third summarized the difficulty neighbors found in reading the indicators: “There was always a lot of movement in the two flats and he was a strange person with a badly groomed beard and had no interaction with anybody. But to go from that to that he was involved with Bin Laden…” (\textit{La Vanguardia} 15 April 2002).

By contrast, the surveillance of the state was decisive. Press reports of the November 2001 arrests explained that investigating judge Baltasar Garzón and his team had had their eye on the group for years, monitoring phone calls since at least 1996, and had gradually built up a case that at last held no room for doubt. The neighbors were cited almost as if to prove their incompetence by contrast. And indeed this is a routine motif of this subgenre of the news story, the surprise arrest. In Spain as elsewhere,\textsuperscript{19} police come in to arrest the apparently ordinary householder who turns out to be a mafioso, a drug-dealer, a serial killer, or, as in this case, a terrorist. When the neighbors are interviewed, they express their bewilderment, try to reread the information they have as indices of the now-revealed truth. As a rule – at least in middle-class neighborhoods in which the authority of police and state are recognized – the neighbors bow to the superior knowledge of the latter. Why then should the neighbors be interviewed at all?

In part they are an inheritance of genre, artifacts of an earlier identity regime. The narrative of domesticity continues to presuppose a certain norm of neighborly interaction and mutual observation. The neighbor is therefore the natural witness to identity, and himself the embodiment of community norms. The failure of the neighbor to grasp the activities of the criminal points, therefore, to a failure of social control and validates the need for state surveillance.

More than that: could the neighbors be abdicating responsibility? It might be said (oversimplifying as such narratives must) that hitherto the state has attempted to intervene in – sometimes fostering, more often obstructing – the horizontal relations of its citizens, and state surveillance has attempted to replace or coopt the neighborly gaze.\textsuperscript{20} Today, out of exhaustion rather than desire, citizens increasingly outsource the office of social control, relying on the state to conduct the community surveillance they no longer have the means or time to undertake. On the supply side – the availability of inquisitive neighbors – the integration of the
Spanish economy into the global one has increased working hours and removed the workplace to a greater distance from the home, reducing neighborhood sociability. At the same time, it has provided consumer goods within the home, rendering private space far more attractive than it once was.\(^\text{21}\) On the demand side—the desire to monitor others in order to reaffirm one’s own individual and collective identity—the problem has grown more complex with the pluralization of norms in Spanish society, again resulting from factors such as the opening of the economy first to tourism, then to consumerism and personal mobility, then to mass extra-European immigration. The significant other need no longer be a neighbor: aspirations range far more widely for many people. In short, Galán could do as he liked. The neighbors were insufficiently interested for discretion and disguise to make any difference. Without common norms and a more determined culture of social control, the neighbors found Galán as indeterminate as the paradox of his half-Muslim, half-Spanish alias. To continue the visual metaphor, they could not resolve his image. “It seemed both impossible that he was and impossible that he wasn’t what he was.”\(^\text{22}\)

Galán was once interviewed in his Madrid mosque by CNN, in search of Muslim opinion. If such representation were routinely sought on all public issues, would violence still be so widespread a strategy for achieving recognition? Liberal multiculturalism proposes a solution that should obviate the motivations for terrorism among the disempowered. The recognition of communities as distinctive, valuable, and above all, present within the state will ensure the dignity and equal opportunities of the individuals who constitute them.

In addressing the new immigration, Spanish policy makers have generally acknowledged that representation in the media is not sufficient (even supposing that it existed): real interaction in shared community space is necessary to full personhood. Urban cultural offices have generally sought to promote this by the same means used in the U.S. and elsewhere in Europe, using museums and festivals to celebrate immigrant arts as a bridge to immigrant personhood. With much success; but as is so often the case, an increase in spaces marked off as “cultural” is counterbalanced by the a larger erosion of the everyday neighborhood spaces in which immigrants and natives could meet as individuals and develop shared informal norms.\(^\text{23}\)

Aziz Al-Azmeh observes that the reifications of Islamic fundamentalism draw upon the culturalism of the West, the “clash of civilizations” logic that assumes the incommensurability and mutual impenetrability of different cultures (1996). Even multiculturalism in its softer forms tends to reduce individuals into representatives of communities, the identity of which is based in the possession of esoteric, untranslatable knowledge—collective secrets. At the level of public recognition, there are only communities; individuals exist only at the level of surveillance. Both of these forms of visibility are the creations of the bureaucratic state, and the former can become nearly as cold and calculating as the latter. To cross through into face-to-face human recognition, with breathing bodies and individual gazes attached to it, what must the dislocated person do? Appropriate a community, first of all, making its project one’s own: and this has become a strategy not now for immigrants alone, but widely pursued by the equally anonymous “majority,” the Luis José Galán Gonzálezes of Western societies. The collectivity confers meaning, since collectivities have a public existence and forms of display—they have faces, or façades. But the warmth of contact is less easily recovered once the neighbors have withdrawn. In the absence of mutually negotiated ritual—structures mediating between spectacle and corporeal existence—the sleeper-terrorist replaces the trivial spectacle of “bureaucratic multiculturalism” (Scher 2003) with what Bataille saw as the ideal form of immanence, the violent encounter (1973).

The Neighbors Close Ranks

The case of Yusuf Galán suggests a dire master narrative of increasingly violent struggles for recognition against a background of ever less contested state surveillance, paradoxically legitimated by the need to protect the liberal individual. But a later series of Al-Qaeda arrests...
in Spain gives us a more hopeful story, of the kind increasingly being told by anti-globalization activists, which has its local roots in the resistance to the Franco regime.

On January 24, 2003 there was a second major police raid of alleged Al-Qaeda operatives. 24 men were taken and 16 held in “Operation Lake,” named for the Lake of Banyoles in Catalonia, near which several of the arrests took place. Arrests were made in the early hours of the morning and the 150 officers involved caused considerable neighborhood disruption. Doors of flats were destroyed, flats searched, and materials confiscated; in one case the police broke down the door of the wrong flat. In a speech the same day, President José María Aznar cited the arrests as proving that “we are not speaking of fantasies but of realities,” and that, given the threat of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction, Spain must consider well “the event in Catalonia in order to avoid a tragedy in our security” (La Vanguardia 25 January 2003).

The press coverage of these arrests was immediately very different from that of the previous operation. Long before the supposed ricin and anthrax ingredients were revealed by laboratory analysis to be such domestic substances as couscous spices and laundry soap, long before the last of the men were released for lack of evidence four months later, strong skepticism was evident. El Mundo, a national newspaper generally sympathetic to the Aznar government, said little about the operation itself. But the socialist El País of Madrid, the centrist-Catalanist La Vanguardia and Avui of Barcelona, and the left-Catalanist Punt Diari of Girona told a different story. They gave an extensive account of the police operation, described as needlessly destructive and disruptive. The families of those detained were given voice and the neighbors were presented as both outraged by the conduct of the police and strong in the defense of those arrested – their neighbors. These lengthy reportages were tellingly juxtaposed with coverage of Aznar’s speech, Bush’s congratulatory phone call, and Colin Powell’s citing of the Spanish arrests in a statement to the U.N. It did not take many days for the editorial pages to connect the dots explicitly and declare the arrests pure opportunism. In this view, the Aznar government was striving at once to sell the war to the public, to set the native population against immigrants in order to impose a more restrictive policy, and further to erode civil liberties and the presumption of innocence. Punt Diari, the local newspaper of the region where the arrests took place, was strongest in both its suspicion of the state and its use of the neighbor discourse, emphasizing the violation of domestic and community space as doors were broken down, children left crying in the street for their fathers, and so on.

El Punt’s coverage showed, furthermore, an intensive community response to the arrests. Neighbors and coworkers declared their concern for the families of those arrested. A local businessman offered to pay for the education of the children – an education better than any Spanish policeman could afford for his children, he added. Clerics and voluntary associations protested the demonization of immigrants. The squatters’ movement of Barcelona, also facing state invasion of its domestic space, declared solidarity. Festivals were held to support a legal defense fund. The local solidarity campaign quickly merged with the antiwar movement, and the detainees came home to welcoming ceremonies and places of honor in the antiwar marches. The released detainees were interviewed in the press, given individual face and voice as no “terrorist” can be (Zulaika 1995). The category of terrorism was itself contextualized: some of the men were indeed involved with the Algerian Salafista movement, but public sympathy was invoked by reminders of the repressive Algerian regime – and having known a parallel situation, many Catalans do not condemn armed insurrection out of hand. Finally, both the newspaper coverage and the solidarity demonstrations embraced the carnivalesque, with extensive ridicule of the search for evidence: laundry soap was dumped in front of the civil governor’s headquarters, and there was a gleeful headline when the Minister of the Interior asked the public kindly to stop making jokes about the soap.

A soberer story could have been told about the detained men; while the evidence against them was inconclusive, it was not pure
fabrication. But the context had changed radically. According to the new reading of the situation, the Aznar government (easily equated by Catalanists with the Spanish state as a whole) was supporting a dangerous and illegitimate war in the teeth of public opinion in order to win U.S. recognition, much as Franco had done in the 1953 defense treaty (Elordi 2003). Another echo of the Franco regime was seen in Aznar’s use of the terrorist threat to justify tighter controls on regional activists.25

The apparent revival of Francoist state action provoked a parallel revival of anti-Francoist community activism. A discourse of solidarity based not in common individual identities but in common resistance to an intrusive state – the assemblea or coalition model (cf. Noyes 2003) – came back to life in the massive antiwar movement, as more locally in on behalf of the men arrested in Operation Lake. We should note that the neighbor is not only a key metaphor of this model but in fact one of its major points of origin. The desperate living conditions of migrant labor in Madrid and Barcelona during the speculative boom of the 1960s provoked the formation of the Asociaciones de Vecinos (neighborhood associations), which gradually brought together people of different backgrounds and party affiliations in an affirmation of the de facto relationship of residential proximity. These associations, which local authorities were forced to recognize, became the earliest large-scale movement in late Francoist civil society, providing experience in democratic practice to ordinary people and fostering the more overtly political movements that brought the dictatorship to an end (Castells 1983).

Many participants remarked on the revival of devices from the transition to democracy in the antiwar protests: La Vanguardia summed it up as “Barcelona, de fiesta contra la guerra” (31 March 2003). As during the Transition, the ominous equation of fireworks and cannons made by Pons in 1878 was here reversed: a Punt Diari editorial on the Saint John’s Eve celebration (after all the Operation Lake detainees had been released) noted that here was a night when everyone had explosives in the house, and each domesticity, native and immigrant, came together in a common explosion (25 June 2003).

A genre adapted from Latin America enhanced not only the festival but the neighborhood character of the protests: the cacerolada. Like the tancades or sit-ins of the Transition, the cacerolada was a façade performance in reverse: it was not outsiders demanding entry, but insiders denouncing the invasion of their private space. At 9:45 every evening from mid-March through April, citizens came out on their balconies and, for a quarter of an hour, banged pots and pans in rejection of the war: domestic chaos against a state-imposed order.26 On a larger scale, Barcelona’s reenactment with black balloons of its bombing during the Civil War was denounced by some as in dubious taste, but marked again a construction of Barcelonans and Iraqis as parallel insiders, threatened by powerful states.

State, Community, Individual

Few Spaniards I know would discount any of the stories I have detailed here as future possibilities. Although they fall in a historical sequence, this is not a progression from one dispensation to another. Rather, once created, practices and discourses remain to be recovered at need, though the material conditions that support their circulation will foster the dominance of one or another at any given moment. It may be helpful to review the broad outlines of the four stories (see table).

As a folklorist, I am led by professional interest to cheer for the fourth scenario and by professional training to doubt that any of the four will ever go away. Solidarity with distant Iraq cost Spaniards little, a skeptic might say, and the sixteen detainees of Operation Lake were thrown in as makeweights. Can the local solidarities of natives and immigrants or of squatters and bourgeois householders be sustained? Most Spaniards who lived through the Transition would doubt it, given the inevitable breakdown of that community when individual interests began to reassert themselves and use the machinery of the state to do so. There is also the question of efficacy. The antiwar protests did not succeed in changing the government position, and Aznar’s Partido Popular was not significantly punished in the June municipal elections, so community press-
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ure failed to control even the actions of individual voters. It remains to be seen – the antiglobalization movement provides the global test case of the moment – how far state policies or individual behaviors can be transformed by democratic, coalition-based movements, which seem to depend heavily on moments of collective effervescence. The fundamentalist movements that compete with them exercise far stricter quotidian control over individuals, and their resultant organizational strength has given them far more influence over states.

Yusuf Galán, a westerner in search of identity, participated in both types of movement and found the latter more rewarding. It seems increasingly common for liberal multiculturalism to fragment into local communitarianisms and eventually into fundamentalisms. Individuals may choose a community – based in ethnicity, religion, or other factors – but they are subsequently determined by it in the eyes of others. And having their own choice to justify, they find it in practice difficult to deal with others who have chosen differently. The given community of material coexistence becomes increasingly intolerable, the need to bring the given and the imagined communities into accordance more extreme. Fundamentalism, as many scholars have shown, is a way of stabilizing the everyday world of individuals through recourse to the rational-bureaucratic apparatus of institutions: legislating identity to provide recourse to the rational-bureaucratic apparatus against internal insecurities (e.g. Roy 1994). Political Islam attempts to resolve ambiguity by forcible erasure of incongruous elements. The Jihad warrior assumes this power at a personal level, identifying himself with the state or would-be state’s capacity for violent erasure and placing both in the service of the imagined community. The sleeper becomes the most powerful instance, gaining visibility and a stable self in the act of erasing and destabilizing the world around him. With such a price to pay for an integrated identity, I cannot help feeling some nostalgia for that untidy urban neighborhood and, indeed, for that incomplete liberal project.

Notes

1. Thanks to the discussants and participants in the conference for a rich conversation; to Ernest Hakanen and Peter Suedfeld for help with sources; and to John and Regina Bendix for everything.
2. Unless otherwise indicated in the bibliography, all translations are mine.
3. See also Todorov 2001; Fabian 1999:53 gives a useful breakdown of the senses of “recognition” according to the German vocabulary; he argues that the overwhelmingly ethical emphasis of the recognition debate has forestalled the epistemological problems.
4. Goffman (1961) and Scott (1990) provide useful correctives to Foucault in demonstrating the complex dynamics in practice of “total institutions” and the modern state.
5. See for example Peristiany ed. (1966) and Bailey ed. (1971). Susan Tax Freeman’s Neighbors (1970) inaugurated an alternative tradition emphasizing egalitarian structures of cooperation; the more usual theme has been competition, but in any case the delicate balance of competition and solidarity in neighborhood relationships is a major debate in the anthropology of Spain as it is within Spanish communities.
6. For reasons of space, many important issues such as gender and regional difference must be deferred for a later discussion.
7. To be sure, there is nothing uniquely Spanish about any of this, but such performances are a conspicuous dimension of Castilian and Catalan traditional culture.
8. See Álvarez Junco (2000) for an efficient summary of the two stereotypes.
9. “Down with those who are up!”, a parody slogan current since at least 1868.
11. The calls for amnesia here foreshadow those of the 1970s transition to democracy, when old differences seemed equally intractable.
12. For this paper I have had no access to critical work on the obscure Pons i Massaveu. The structural parallels as well as many details of urban décor and political discourse suggest that he had access to Robrenyo’s play. Pons’ narrator mentions the Diario de Barcelona as a source for the period, good evidence of Pons’ own use of it, and this newspaper chronicled Robrenyo’s activities extensively (Fàbregas 1975:131). Pons may therefore have been stimulated to consult Robrenyo’s collected works, published in the later liberal moment of 1855 (133).
14. Each accuses the other of illegitimate secrecy: Bruno associates Mariano with the Masons, who were indeed the organizers of liberalism in Spain;
and Mariano notes that Bruno has just returned from a town in the Carlist hotbed of the Montseny, where conspiring was indeed going on.

15. Historians and politicians have long cited the Napoleonic resistance as the originary moment of popular Spanish nationalism (e.g. Carr 1982). Recent historiography, however, has amply documented the extent to which the famous Spanish popular resistance is a mythical construct used to legitimize the Spanish state (Esaïe 2003).

16. Annetta is repeatedly defined as “Catalan,” while Llorenç’s poverty of intellectual resources marks him as “a good Spaniard;” by this period there was a strong etymonic association between Catalan ethnicity and bourgeois modernization in Spain.

17. The liberal Oller’s perspective is very similar to that of the Anglo-Saxon anthropologists.

18. Suedfeld suggests that relative personal insignificance may be a motivation for joining a secret organization, and much current popular culture in the U.S. treats the media-driven desire for fame as an incentive to spectacular violence: consider the film Natural Born Killers, or the debates over of school shootings.

19. I have been unable to locate mass media scholarship discussing the neighbor motif in news stories, but Wagner-Pacifić’s work on the representation of neighborhood and the norms of domesticity in a similar confrontation between state, community, and “deviant” householders has been useful (1994). This genre has a rather Americanized feel to it in the Spanish context, as does the social reality it represents.

20. A history of such attempts could begin in Spain with the early modern Inquisition’s endeavor to foster a culture of denunciation (Kamen 1985), and go on to such moments as the Enlightenment reforms of the late 18th century (Noyes 1998) and the proto-socialist urbanism of the mid-19th century (Cerdà 1999).

21. Urban design has built upon this transformation with the multiplication of mass rather than collective public spaces and of new residential suburbs. The Al-Qaeda handbook urges its operatives to settle in new housing developments, “where people do not know one another” (Filkins 2002).

22. A measure of the perceived collapse of the neighborhood might be seen in the new prominence of the urban legend as a genre, now receiving in Spain both the popular and the scholarly attention it has long had in the U.S. (Sánchez-Carretero 2001). In contrast to gossip, which reduces the conduct of neighbors to known categories subject to evaluation, the urban legend (in which immigrants and cross-cultural encounters increasingly figure) highlights the unknowability of neighbors.

23. See, for example, the essays in Bendix and Welz eds. (1999). Several anthropologists have written on the loss of public neighborhood space in Barcelona’s Barri Xino, beginning with McDonogh (1987). Much could be said, of course, about the voluntaristic community forms emerging in reaction to the privatization of urban space; but many Spaniards recognize the importance of the neighborhood as creating a given community in which modes of convivencia must perform collective interests.

24. Their statements were prudent but not excessively so: they declared their gratitude to their neighbors and to the state for the justice eventually done; they expressed the anger with America that was also being expressed by their Spanish neighbors, and complained of economic loss and, more seriously, that their arrests had exposed their families in Algeria to reprisals.

25. Aznar’s foreign policy has not been alone in reawakening public suspension of the state. The last two years have also seen government calls for “Spanish patriotism,” the Prestige disaster in which Spanish government action radically worsened the impact of an oil spill, and (in addition to the usual tensions with the historic regions) the outlawing of the Basque separatist party Herri Batasuna.

26. The protest extended into the smallest communities of Catalonia and brought out all classes and persuasions: rural towns with a dozen remaining inhabitants took pride in their universal participation, and the temporal and spatial reach of the protests was also extended by audiovisual recordings on the Web.

References


